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ARTICLES 
GAMESMANSHIP AND CRIMINAL PROCESS 
John D. King*  
ABSTRACT 
We first learn formal structures of rules, procedures, and norms of conduct 
through games and sports. These lessons illuminate and inform human behav-
ior in other contexts, including the adversarial world of criminal litigation. 
As critiques of the legitimacy and fairness of the criminal justice system 
increase, the philosophy and jurisprudence of sport offer a comparative legal 
system to examine criminal litigation. Allegations of gamesmanship—the 
aggressive and strategic use of rules that violate some sense of decorum or 
culture yet remain within the formal rules of engagement—cut across both 
contexts. This Article examines what sports can teach us about gamesmanship 
in criminal litigation. 
After distinguishing gamesmanship from cheating, this Article compares several 
examples of gamesmanship in sport and criminal litigation. These examples address 
the Crawford right of confrontation, the Brady obligation to disclose favorable evi-
dence to the defendant, and the Batson prohibition against using race in jury selec-
tion. This Article uses the jurisprudence of sport to propose a framework within 
which to view these claims in the criminal justice context. Recognizing the asym-
metrical nature of the adversarial criminal justice system and the dual role of pros-
ecutors as advocates and ministers of justice, this Article argues that prosecutorial 
gamesmanship poses a different and more acute danger to the legitimacy of the 
criminal adjudication system than does such behavior by defense lawyers. 
This Article concludes that gamesmanship is not only an inevitable part of any 
rule-based adversarial contest but also a positive and productive phenomenon 
that forces those invested in a system to define which values and objectives are 
fundamental to that system. Only when an instance of gamesmanship is inconsis-
tent with these broader values or objectives should it be regulated or eliminated.   
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INTRODUCTION 
We first learn formal structures of rules and norms of conduct through games 
and sports. Notions of fair play, sportsmanship, and cheating are developed 
from an early age on basketball courts, playgrounds, and soccer fields. Today, 
as many critique the legitimacy of the American criminal justice system in sev-
eral different respects, those who care about the integrity of the criminal jus-
tice system can learn from ideas and philosophies of fairness and cheating in 
the sports context. Specifically, the idea of “gamesmanship” in criminal proce-
dure has fruitful analogies in the world of sport. In the adversarial world of 
American criminal adjudication, prosecutors and defense attorneys occasion-
ally accuse each other of “playing games” instead of playing fair. But what 
one person would characterize as gamesmanship, another would characterize 
as zealously using the rules to the advantage of one’s client or cause. And 
whereas “cheating” (in the sense of violating the constitutional or statutory 
rules that govern criminal practice) provides relatively clear lines of accept-
ability, the more interesting and difficult questions instead involve the aggres-
sive use of rules that might violate some sense of decorum or culture, but stay 
within the formal rules of engagement. 
The concept of gamesmanship is notoriously tricky to define, but one useful def-
inition from the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport is “a strategy designed for 
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winning regardless of athletic excellence.”1 Translated to the criminal litigation 
context, this idea might imperfectly be expressed as “a strategy designed for win-
ning regardless of the factual and legal merits of the case.” Such a definition reso-
nates with the negative connotations of the term in litigation: one side may use it to 
accuse the other side of engaging in tactics that have nothing to do with the true 
goal or ultimate systemic objective of the litigation. Others looking at the concept 
of gamesmanship from a philosophical angle have found a meaningful distinction 
between “the rules of the game” and “the code of fair play.”2 The code of fair play, 
which is an unwritten set of shared expectations among the participants about the 
range of acceptable behavior, overlaps but is not co-extensive with the official 
rules of the game.3 Some actions do not violate the rules but would offend notions 
of fair play, while other actions that violate the rules would not be seen as outside 
of the code of fair play.4 One such example is the intentional foul in basketball, 
which is against the rules of the game but is in no way seen as violating notions of 
fair play. Conversely, some litigators take the position that objecting during an 
opponent’s opening statement or closing argument to a jury violates some shared 
expectation or norm of conduct, although doing so is certainly within the official 
rules of engagement and in fact might be necessary to enforce those formal rules. 
Although usually invoked in a pejorative sense in sport and in criminal practice, 
gamesmanship can serve an important and productive purpose. By clarifying the 
boundaries of acceptable practice and by bringing into stark relief the limitations 
of existing rules, gamesmanship forces us to establish and defend which objectives 
are essential and which values are central to a system. Only where a practice of 
gamesmanship subverts or undermines an overarching goal is it problematic.5 The 
overall professed goals of the criminal justice system are familiar: the ascertain-
ment of truth and application of just verdicts within a system that protects individ-
ual rights and human dignity.6 If gamesmanship subverts these ends, it should be 
discouraged in criminal litigation. But the prescription depends entirely on how 
one defines the goals of the system within which gamesmanship is deployed. 
Often, what appears to be gamesmanship may be perfectly aligned with a broader 
goal and so should not only be tolerated but also encouraged.7 
1. Leslie A. Howe, Gamesmanship, 31 J. PHIL. SPORT 212, 212 (2004). 
2. DAVID PAPINEAU, KNOWING THE SCORE: WHAT SPORTS CAN TEACH US ABOUT PHILOSOPHY (AND WHAT 
PHILOSOPHY CAN TEACH US ABOUT SPORTS) 54 (2017). 
3. See id. at 54 (defining the code of fair play as “the expectations that the athletes have of each other, their 
sense of what is and is not acceptable behaviour” and noting that fair play is “often consistent with breaking a 
game’s rules”). 
4. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE- 
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) (discussing the difference between norms and rules). 
5. See Howe, supra note 1, at 216, 218. 
6. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966) (“The basic purpose of a trial is the 
determination of truth . . . .”). 
7. Howe, supra note 1, at 221 (arguing that not using certain types of gamesmanship is “disrespectful of the 
opponent—it implies that the other competitor is not significant enough to warrant one’s full attention”). 
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An important caveat in comparing sports to criminal litigation is the asymmetry 
in role and resources between the contestants. Although a general requirement of 
sport is that each participant faces the same restrictions, is bound by the same rules, 
and pursues the same goals,8 our tradition of criminal justice assigns different 
objectives to prosecutors and defense lawyers. Because of these different roles, 
rules of gamesmanship should apply differently to the different players in the crim-
inal justice system. Defense lawyers are bound, as a matter of ethics, to pursue the 
interests of their clients and to use whatever legal and ethical means are available 
to them to achieve their clients’ goals.9 Prosecutors, on the other hand, are required 
not primarily to be advocates, but to be “ministers of justice.”10 In a very real sense, 
then, prosecutors and defense lawyers are—or at least should be—playing different 
games. Some kinds of strategic behavior by defense lawyers can be acceptable and 
even socially productive while the same kinds of behavior by prosecutors would 
be inconsistent with their institutional role and therefore unacceptable. 
In addition to the different roles assigned, an imbalance of resources that virtu-
ally always favors the prosecution provides another justification for limiting the 
use of gamesmanship by prosecutors.11 The real problem facing our criminal courts 
is not one of excessive zeal and gamesmanship by defense lawyers but rather a sys-
tem of mass processing that undervalues zeal, due process, and adversarial testing 
of evidence.12 Aggressive application of procedural rules by defense lawyers can 
help to restore some of the balance to the adversarial process. 
In our seemingly boundless appetite for watching sports, Americans generally 
accept without much debate the legitimacy—if not always the accuracy—of the 
process of rule enforcement in sports.13 On the other hand, many have called into 
question the fairness, neutrality, and legitimacy of the American criminal justice 
8. See PAPINEAU, supra note 2, at 68 (“The various understandings of fair play observed by different sports are 
like contracts that you enter into when you start a match.”). 
9. See CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION 4-1.1(b), (d) (AM. BAR. ASS’N, 2019) (providing that 
the primary duties of defense counsel is to their clients and that they should act “zealously” for their clients). 
10. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (“We have several times underscored the ‘special 
role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials.’” (citation omitted)); MODEL 
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (describing the role of the prosecutor); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (quoting the Department of Justice’s saying that “The United States wins its 
point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.”). Compare CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE 
PROSECUTION 3-1.2(c) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2019) (describing the role of the prosecutor as “seek[ing] justice”) with 
CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION 4-1.2(b) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2019) (stating that the basic duty of 
defense counsel is “to serve as their clients’ counselor and advocate with courage and devotion”). 
11. Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 
531, 532–33 (2007). 
12. See, e.g., ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN 
AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 110 (2018) (describing argument that blames high caseloads as “leading to 
an excessively administrative mindset, where norms of cooperation overpower norms of conflict, thereby eroding 
the adversarial roles of defense and prosecuting attorneys”). 
13. Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 239, 240 (1998) (“Perhaps because 
we grew up playing and watching a game in which law matters and rules count, we have learned to accept the 
different views of judges and the finality of their decisions.”). 
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system.14 This Article compares these “legal” systems and the ways that each deals 
with allegations of gamesmanship, seeking to illuminate productive ways that the 
criminal justice system can understand and, when necessary, address such claims 
by altering the procedural rules by which claims are adjudicated.15 This Article 
proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces the potential for examining sport as a com-
parative legal system that can illuminate important aspects of American criminal 
justice. Part II discusses some illustrative allegations of gamesmanship in both 
criminal litigation and in sport. Part III analyzes the distinction between games-
manship and cheating, and examines some regulatory responses to unwanted 
gamesmanship in the context of sport. Finally, Part IV proposes a framework by 
which the American criminal justice system can evaluate claims of gamesmanship 
and determine whether and when regulatory intervention would be desirable. 
Recognizing that gamesmanship is not only an inevitable but also a positive and 
productive force in both sports and criminal litigation, reformers should take action to 
curb a specific practice only when it conflicts with a broad and fundamental goal of 
the criminal justice system. But where a practice is at odds with some important value 
or objective, legislatures and courts should alter procedural rules and penalties to 
eliminate these specific forms of gamesmanship. In this process, however, we should 
remain cognizant of the different roles assigned to prosecutors and defense lawyers in 
criminal litigation and the particularly corrosive effect that prosecutorial gamesman-
ship can have on the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 
I. WHY LOOK AT SPORTS RULES? 
The study of sports and games can illuminate any aspect of human activity. 
Almost a century ago, Dutch historian Johan Huizinga convincingly demonstrated 
that “[t]he great archetypal activities of human society are all permeated with play 
from the start.”16 Those seeking to make sense of the American criminal justice 
system have looked to sports as an alternative legal regime at least since Jeremy 
14. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice 
System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 829 (2003) (describing the “overwhelming empirical evidence” of 
unjust and unequal treatment of African Americans in the criminal justice system); John Tyler Clemons, Blind 
Injustice: The Supreme Court, Implicit Racial Bias, and the Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, 51 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 689, 692 (2014) (stating that implicit racial bias is a “sinister, surreptitious force [that] taints 
the criminal justice decision-making of even the best intentioned”); Connie Hasset-Walker, Thomas Lateano & 
Michael Di Benedetto, Do Female Sex Offenders Receive Preferential Treatment in Criminal Charging and 
Sentencing?, 35 JUST. SYS. J. 62, 63 (2014) (discussing the shorter incarceration sentences and lesser offense 
charges that female sex offenders receive due to gaps in knowledge and biases). 
15. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate 
Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 1012 (1999) (“Given the importance of sport to the American 
people, one might consider the process through which sports contests are judged as a means of exploring the 
relationship of process to the legitimacy of particular outcomes.”). 
16. Jennifer W. Reynolds, Games, Dystopia, and ADR, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 477, 485 (2012) 
(alteration in original) (quoting JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN CULTURE 
(1938)); see also Barbara Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1135 n.11 (1982) (using sports as a metaphor to analyze prosecutorial behavior 
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Bentham did so in the nineteenth century.17 The long history of comparing legal sys-
tems to sporting systems continues to this day, although not everyone is comfortable 
with the analogy. With a recognition of the vastly different objectives of law and 
sports in mind, however, looking to sports for a comparative legal analysis allows for 
a fresh perspective on difficult issues in the context of criminal litigation. 
A. Comparing “Legal” Regimes 
Legal scholars and philosophers study games as a lens into, and a microcosm of, 
larger social problems.18 Games are an attractive object of study because “they are 
intellectually accessible and compact, providing quick traction for examinations 
into the structure, dynamics, and norms of interpersonal and organizational behav-
iors.”19 The frequent use of sports and games as metaphors for legal rules and cul-
ture, however, is matched by an ambivalence about whether viewing legal disputes 
as games is an appropriate comparison, given the lack of seriousness that defines 
games.20 
See Reynolds, supra note 16, at 488 (noting such analogies are “problematic because of the playful, 
arbitrary attributes of games”). On the importance of sports to the formation of values and role models, however, 
see Hua Hsu, Should We Keep Politics Out of Sports?, THE NEW YORKER (Sep. 24, 2018), https://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/24/should-we-keep-politics-out-of-sports. Hsu gives an example of the effect 
of such a role model: 
In 2014, the Times political reporter Mark Leibovich was on his way to interview the Patriots’ 
superstar quarterback, Tom Brady, when he recalled feeling something unprecedented: he was 
nervous. . . . His professional life requires him to be unfazed by politicians and policymakers, peo-
ple with true power over our everyday realities. Yet he retained a bit of awe for Brady: “Sports 
pedestals are funny that way. Athletes often constitute our earliest objects of allegiance.”  
Id. See MARK LEIBOVICH, BIG GAME: THE NFL IN DANGEROUS TIMES (Penguin Press ed., 2018) for a fuller 
exploration of the broader significance of sports as a constitutive component of identity. 
Comparisons to sports and games are seen as positive insofar as they 
demonstrate adherence to a predetermined set of specific procedures that apply  
after Brady v. Maryland and noting the growing body of research that concludes “that the study of games and 
play explains many facets of society”). 
17. See Babcock, supra note 16, at 1137 (citing Bentham as an “early and still celebrated” critic of the 
adversary system who compared the system to games). 
18. The political role of sports in modern society has a long and contested history. While Theodore Roosevelt 
claimed that sports “encourage a true democratic spirit,” Noam Chomsky argued that sports are a capitalist trick 
to sedate the masses, “an area which has no meaning and probably thrives because it has no meaning, as a 
displacement from the serious problems which one cannot influence . . . .” Compare President Theodore 
Roosevelt, Address at the Harvard Union, (Feb. 23, 1907), reprinted in IN THE WORDS OF THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT: QUOTATIONS FROM THE MAN IN THE ARENA 176 (Patricia O’Toole ed., 2012) with NOAM CHOMSKY, 
THE CHOMSKY READER 33 (Pantheon Books ed., 1987). 
19. Reynolds, supra note 16, at 485. Reynolds states this accessibility goes beyond academics who theorize 
about the analogy: 
For lawyers, games and sports provide familiar shorthand for understanding and explaining how 
legal culture operates. Indeed, as a descriptive matter, litigation is easy to depict as a game: 
Players and umpires (lawyers and judges) conduct themselves according to substantive and proce-
dural rules in pursuit of one or more well-defined goals.  
Id. at 485–86. 
20. 
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impartially to all players.21 Such comparisons, however, can also be seen as a nega-
tive because games and sports often reflect a win-at-all-costs mentality without 
regard to broader or higher values.22 Arthur Allen Leff referred to the “ludic meta-
phor” as the tendency of legal systems and players to derive legitimacy from com-
parison to games and the systems of rules that govern games.23 Although Leff 
recognized the imperfect comparison of law to games and conceded that law is not 
simply a game, he argued that the law is “not not a game either.”24 Some have 
traced the philosophical and historical underpinnings of the adversarial system of 
adjudication to medieval models of trial by ordeal and by battle.25 Whether or not a 
fully appropriate comparison, our system of law has much in common with sports 
and games and, accordingly, has much to learn from their examples.26 
B. The Long History of Comparing Law to Sport 
The comparison of law to sport has a long and conflicted history. While one 
recent example is Chief Justice John Roberts comparing the role of a judge to a 
baseball umpire—i.e., merely calling balls and strikes27
Roberts: ‘My job is to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat,’ CNN (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www. 
cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/. 
—Roscoe Pound criticized 
the “sporting theory of justice” over a century earlier.28 Pound argued that the pub-
lic lost faith in the justice system when that system was seen as just another mani-
festation of sport: both sides engaged in mutual combat like two teams in a 
sporting event.29 An even earlier critic of what came to be called the “sporting 
theory of justice” was Jeremy Bentham.30 Bentham criticized the privilege against 
self-incrimination, arguing that it served no purpose except to make the criminal 
trial more “fair” in the sense of a fox hunt, in which the fox must have some chance 
of escape.31 Far from being a necessary or laudable part of the criminal trial, 
21. See Reynolds, supra note 16, at 486 (“Players and umpires (lawyers and judges) conduct themselves 
according to substantive and procedural rules in pursuit of one or more well-defined goals.”). 
22. See id. at 488 (“Game metaphors can have multiple and sometimes conflicting uses in legal texts, standing 
in for both fair process (good) and nonserious, cynical tactics (bad).”). 
23. See Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 998–1003 (1978). Leff argued that games provide an 
appealing organizational model because of the determinacy provided by the use of a set of procedures mutually 
agreed upon in advance of the contest. Id. 
24. Id. at 1005. 
25. Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 653, 667–68 (2007) 
(citing Marian Neef & Stuart Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the American Legal System from a Historical 
Perspective, 20 N.Y.L.F. 123, 133–47, 153–61 (1974)). 
26. More contemporary commentators have questioned the use of “masculinist” sports metaphors for legal 
analysis. See Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 15, at 995 n.7 (outlining the objections); Michael J. Yelnosky, If You 
Write It, (S)he Will Come: Judicial Opinions, Metaphors, Baseball, and “the Sex Stuff,” 28 CONN. L. REV. 813, 
842–43 (1996) (same). 
27. 
28. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 
729 (1906), reprinted in 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1956). 
29. Id. at 14–16. 
30. Babcock, supra note 16, at 1137. 
31. Id. 
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Bentham argued, the privilege against self-incrimination introduced into the crimi-
nal trial the concept of 
“fairness” in the sense in which the word is used by sportsmen. The fox is to 
have a fair chance for his life: he must have (so close is the analogy) what is 
called “law”—leave to run a certain length of way for the express purpose of 
giving him a chance for escape. . . . In the sporting code, these laws are 
rational, being obviously conducive to the professed end. Amusement is that 
end; a certain quantity of delay is essential to it; dispatch, a degree of dispatch 
reducing the quantity of delay below the allowed minimum, would be fatal to 
it. . . . [T]o different persons, both a fox and a criminal have their use; the use 
of a fox is to be hunted; the use of a criminal is to be tried.32 
Bentham’s argument has modern echoes in critiques of the adversarial system as 
too tied to a game-like philosophy of winners and losers. Criminal law should not 
be like a sporting event, say these critics, because we do not want the process to be 
a competition between two roughly equal adversaries. Instead, we want the guilty 
to lose and the innocent to win.33  
See Rollin Morris Perkins, The Great American Game, HARPER’S MAG. (Nov. 1927), https://harpers.org/ 
archive/1927/11/the-great-american-game/ (“[T]he outstanding purpose of a criminal trial [should] be 
recognized by all to be the undivided effort to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the person charged.”). 
With regard to specific instances of criminal litigation, resort to sports analogy 
is also common. Dissenting in Taylor v. Illinois, in which the Supreme Court 
affirmed a conviction after the trial court had excluded a defense witness as a sanc-
tion for a discovery violation, Justice Brennan famously wrote that “[c]riminal dis-
covery is not a game.”34 Justice Brennan had touched on similar themes years 
earlier in an article entitled The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for 
Truth?35 Such comparisons are familiar in critiques of the shortcomings of our 
legal system from all sides. As an example of commentators’ nostalgia about how 
the legal profession has lost its way, U.S. District Judge Stanley Sporkin said, 
“[L]itigation has become an intricate game rather than a search for truth. I believe 
for this reason the legal profession may no longer be seen as the honorable, revered 
profession that so many of us found when we first entered the profession.”36 Of 
course, this has been a common refrain for ages and every generation of lawyers 
has a tendency to bemoan what the profession has become and to look back nostal-
gically at what may be a mythical idealized past.37 
32. Id. (quoting Jeremy Bentham, Impropriety of the Exclusion Put Upon Self-Disserving Evidence by English 
Law, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 445 (Bowring ed. 1843)). 
33. 
34. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 419 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
35. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 279, 279 (1963). 
36. Stanley Sporkin, The Legal Profession Under Scrutiny, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 401, 401 (1997). 
37. But see infra notes 250–256 and accompanying text (providing several examples from history including 
Clarence Darrow’s cigar trick and Abraham Lincoln’s “phantom moonlight” ploy). 
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More recently, Justice Brennan noted that some of the resistance to the idea 
of extending discovery in criminal cases “derives from a declining but still 
identifiable tendency to regard the criminal trial as being . . . ‘in the nature of a 
game or sporting contest,’ rather than as ‘a serious inquiry aiming to distin-
guish between guilt and innocence.’”38 Long before Taylor, the Court had 
described the goals of the discovery rules as making litigation “less a game of 
blindman’s buff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts dis-
closed to the fullest practicable extent.”39 
Justice Brennan also addressed the use of metaphor in illuminating legal prac-
tice: “Metaphor certainly has its uses in bringing us to an understanding of the vari-
ous elements of the legal system. A metaphor may give more depth to an insight 
than any amount of dry legal discourse.”40 Brennan points out the limitations of 
sports as a metaphor for criminal trial, however, because of the different objectives 
of each: while the fundamental objective of a trial is “the determination of the 
truth,” the fundamental objective of a sporting contest is “to ensure that the person 
or the team with the best skills wins.”41 
Others have emphasized the positive potential in comparing sports to law 
and legal procedure, using the rules of instant replay review in sports to 
explain and illuminate the rules and functions of courts and describing the 
comparison with sports as “our platform for discussing how the system of jus-
tice really works and its importance to our society, as well as the important 
role lawyers and judges play.”42 Looking at sports in relation to a legal system 
is simply a variation of any comparative legal inquiry and can allow for fresh 
perspectives.43 Sports can provide an accessible entry point to discussions of 
law.44 
Many scholars have examined and critiqued aspects of criminal law and proce-
dure through the lens of sports and games.45 As one explained, “[l]egal scholars 
38. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth—A Progress 
Report, 69 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 16 (1990) (quoting Glanville Williams, Advance Notice of the Defense, 1959 CRIM. 
L. REV. 548, 554); see also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 91 
(1949) (“Our contentious trial method, I have said, has its roots in the origin of court trials as substitutes for 
private brawls.”). 
39. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). 
40. Brennan, Jr., supra note 38, at 17. 
41. Id. at 18. 
42. Chad M. Oldfather & Matthew M. Fernholz, Comparative Procedure on a Sunday Afternoon: Instant 
Replay in the NFL as a Process of Appellate Review, 43 IND. L. REV. 45, 46–47 (2009) (quoting Joseph G. 
Bisceglia, CSI, Judge Judy and Civic Education, 95 ILL. B.J. 508, 508 (2007)). 
43. See id. at 48. 
44. See, e.g., Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 227, 
229 (1994) (“[A]ll American lawyers are enmeshed in the normative boundaries of two incompatible legal 
systems: the so-called ‘real’ legal system, which they tediously learn through years of law school, and the legal 
system of baseball, which they pick up effortlessly from playgrounds, sports pages, and television.”). 
45. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, “Let ‘em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 GEO. L.J. 1325 
(2011) [hereinafter Berman, Let ‘em Play]; Mitchell N. Berman, Replay, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1683 (2011) 
[hereinafter Berman, Replay]; Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 
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like to connect sports rules and legal rules—legal analysis sheds light on sports 
rules and sports rules shed light on legal rules governing other structures and 
institutions.”46 In this way, procedural regimes of sports serve as a kind of 
comparative legal system and, as with any comparative analysis, serve to illu-
minate and problematize aspects of our legal system that may otherwise escape 
scrutiny.47 
Professor Mitchell Berman has advocated for the development of a jurispru-
dence of sport, arguing that sport and law have much to learn from each other. 
In “Let ‘em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport,48 Berman pursues 
two agendas. First, he tackles the relatively discrete task of determining the 
advisability of temporal variance in the enforcement of rules: that is, examin-
ing whether rules should be enforced differently depending on how close a 
potential infraction occurs to the end of a game.49 More broadly, however, 
Berman sets out to examine the procedures and practices of sports as a lens 
into how legal systems work.50 Berman recognizes that various legal and phil-
osophical scholars have from time to time used sports analogies to illustrate a 
particular legal point,51 but argues that the “distinct legal systems”52 employed 
by sports are ripe for broader comparative analysis. Not only are sports gener-
ally governed by written codes, but they also “exhibit such essential institu-
tional features as legislatures, adjudicators, and the union of primary and 
secondary rules.”53 
Like organized sports, litigation is an actively managed enterprise. As critiques 
surface about new developments or tactics seen as problematic, actors with power 
can move to alter the procedural regime to restore a balance of power or discourage 
certain behavior.54 Questions of what types of behavior should be allowed, toler-
ated, and encouraged necessarily involve normative determinations about the 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1407 (2011); Linda E. Carter, The Sporting Approach to Harmless Error in Criminal Cases: 
The Supreme Court’s “No Harm, No Foul” Debacle in Neder v. United States, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 229 (1987); 
Babcock, supra note 16; Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 15; Gershman, supra note 11. 
46. Howard M. Wasserman, The Economics of the Infield Fly Rule, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 479, 480 (2013). 
47. See Berman, Replay, supra note 45, at 1683 (“Formal organized sports are, in effect, legal systems, and 
legal theorists might find much both to teach and to learn from by paying closer attention to competitive 
athletics.”). 
48. Berman, Let ‘em Play, supra note 45, at 1331. 
49. Id. 
50. See id. at 1329 (“[J]urisprudential attention to sports and games is decidedly ad hoc. I am unaware of any 
sustained or systematic investigation into the insights that formal sports and municipal legal systems might offer 
up for students of the other.”). 
51. See id. at 1328–29 nn.12–14 (citing John Rawls’s, H.L.A. Hart’s, and Ronald Dworkin’s use of baseball, 
cricket, and chess, respectively, to illustrate various points about rules and constructive interpretation). 
52. Id. at 1329. 
53. Id.; see also id. at 1330 (listing ways in which sports and law attempt to answer many of the same 
procedural questions, including whether to be guided by formal rules or informal norms; how much discretion to 
endow adjudicators and how to guide and limit that discretion; and whether to provide a form of appellate review 
and how to structure that review). 
54. See infra Section II.B. 
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overall objectives of the system.55 How do we decide what should be tolerated and 
encouraged, either in sports or in litigation? Berman answers this question in the 
sports context with reference to what he calls the “competitive desideratum”: the 
main point of an athletic contest is to reward the competitor who demonstrates 
the highest degree of “excellence in executing the particular athletic virtues that 
the sport is centrally designed to showcase, develop, and reward.”56 In deciding 
whether and how to enforce a particular rule, Berman argues that the decision 
maker should consider whether the infraction in question implicates the competi-
tive desideratum; if not, then it is not essential that the rule is always enforced.57 
This discussion illuminates an important distinction between sports and litigation, 
because the primary objective of litigation has nothing to do with the relative skill 
of the lawyers but instead with factors external to their performance, like accuracy 
and fairness.58 
C. Limitations of the Analogy Between Law and Sport 
The critical difference between sports and legal contests is the ultimate objective 
of each: while sporting contests are all about deciding which of the competitors 
best displayed mastery of a skill during the contest, trials are about (in addition to a 
normative moral determination) what happened outside of the courtroom, and 
should seek to minimize or eliminate the skill of the litigators as a factor in the out-
come.59 The overall objectives of the system should dictate the specific procedural 
rules of engagement: 
The usual justification for the adversary system is that truth will emerge from 
a rule-bound contest between two opponents presided over by a passive 
55. Berman argues that the practices must be based on these goals, rather than the current norms: 
Some people think that what I claim to be a puzzle of genuine legal-philosophical interest is no 
puzzle at all. They say that the answer is that it all depends on the “norms,” “customs,” or “con-
ventions” of the sport in question. . . . But this won’t do. For we are seeking not simply a report of 
existing practices but an account of what the practices should be.  
Berman, Let ‘em Play, supra note 45, at 1331 (emphasis added). 
56. Id. at 1358. 
57. See id. 
58. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1035 (1975) 
(stating that the primary objective for a trial judge in an adversary system is to search for truth). 
59. Noting that the procedures of sport and criminal law are not perfect, Babcock states: 
A good game should be won by the better team, most of the time. That is the analog to our belief 
that trial procedure should be designed so as to find the truth, most of the time. But sports are not a 
scientific procedure to investigate objectively and in the abstract the worth of the opposing con-
testants, or to discover and reward merit. The rules and principles that constitute fair play are not 
aimed solely at making certain that the best team wins, but also at assuring that the game is a satis-
fying contest in itself. Thus, full of hope we say “may the best team win,” precisely because we 
know that the best team sometimes does not. That either team may win makes sport and is also 
central to our concept of fair play.  
Babcock, supra note 16, at 1141. 
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umpireal judge. But if the central goal is truth-seeking, why should the prose-
cutor, with his greater resources and access to witnesses, not have the respon-
sibility for putting all the evidence on the table, including that which is 
favorable to an accused?60 
Many scholars have discussed the difference between rules and standards in legal 
adjudication.61 The same distinction applies in the regulation of sports: rules may 
be more appropriate where their application turns on an objective determination of 
the presence or absence of a condition, while standards require more of a subjec-
tive evaluation of intent and effect.62 The lack of discretion in the enforcement of 
rules (as opposed to standards) can be a virtue or a vice depending on the situation 
and one’s point of view: “[T]he choice of rule-based decision-making ordinarily 
entails disabling wise and sensitive decision-makers from making the best deci-
sions in order to disable incompetent or simply wicked decision-makers from mak-
ing wrong decisions.”63 The discussion of rules and standards has direct relevance 
to the questions of whether and how to regulate gamesmanship in both the sports 
and litigation contexts. 
The concept of gamesmanship carries within it the implication of something 
unfair: certainly not cheating, but behavior that might fall short in the eyes of some 
competitors as “fair play.” Professor Barbara Babcock has argued that 
the concepts of fair play in sports and due process in criminal trials are in fact 
united. We have taken the notion of fair play from its native habitat in the 
world of games and sports and applied it directly to our legal procedures. 
Perhaps the reader will come to believe with me that this metaphor aids one’s 
understanding of the requirements of the adversary system.64 
Because criminal trials have a communicative purpose as well as a fact-finding 
function, the game-like aspects of criminal litigation serve a purpose in speaking 
to the community.65 The aspects of criminal procedure that seem like a game “may 
be the most culturally compatible means of saying what we have to say. . . . In our 
culture, the most concrete manifestation of the collective sense of justice is the 
notion of fair play.”66 Babcock examines the Brady rule against this backdrop and 
identifies a tension within Brady and the early cases that interpret it, in that it “vio-
lated a central tenet of agonistic play: In putting forth its best efforts, a team must 
be assured of helping itself more than its opponent.”67 If the criminal justice system 
60.  Id. at 1134. 
61. See, e.g., Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 380 (1985) (noting that “disputes 
that pit a rule against a standard are extremely common in legal discourse”). 
62. See Berman, Let ‘em Play, supra note 45, at 1361 (explaining that “rules turn upon factual predicates that 
are sharper edged, whereas standards require those who apply them to exercise evaluative judgment”). 
63. Id. (quoting SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 153). 
64. Babcock, supra note 16, at 1135–36. 
65. See id. at 1139–40. 
66. Id. at 1140–41. 
67. Id. at 1145. 
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is seen as tolerating behavior that is unfair, that has important implications for pop-
ular understandings and acceptance of the legitimacy of the system. And if games-
manship falls short of cheating but is seen as somehow problematic or undesirable 
anyway, looking to sports for examples of how to treat it might lend insights into 
the question of gamesmanship in criminal litigation. 
One problem with both the idea of a “sporting theory of justice” and more gener-
ally with analogizing sports to criminal litigation is the different institutional roles 
that are assigned to prosecutor and defense lawyer. Because they are asked to be 
not only advocates but also “ministers of justice,” instances of prosecutors 
involved in gamesmanship pose a special threat to the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system.68 The practice of prosecutors making obviously pretextual argu-
ments in order to prevent people of color from serving on criminal juries, for exam-
ple, undermines confidence in the integrity of the system.69 Gamesmanship can be 
corrosive to the public’s trust in a system, whether a system of sports rules or crim-
inal justice. When official actors are seen as behaving arbitrarily or unjustly, the le-
gitimacy of the system is questioned by those who use it.70 As that legitimacy is 
called into question, rates of compliance with the law fall.71 
Rules exist in large part to reassure participants and observers that the system 
can be trusted, and that its outcomes are fair and worthy of respect.72 For this rea-
son, the rules of both criminal procedure and sport need to be adjusted from time to 
time in order to maintain fairness as well as the perception of fairness.73 These 
minor shifts in procedural rules happen all the time, from amendments to civil 
pleading standards, to criminal discovery rules, to the height of the pitcher’s 
mound, and the number of pitches that constitute a walk in baseball.74 Ideally, they 
are implemented to maintain or advance the higher-level objectives of the system, 
whether it is fairness and accuracy in the courts or a balance of offense and defense 
in sports. 
68. See Gershman, supra note 11, at 532 (arguing that, because of the prosecutor’s dual role as advocate but 
also as promoter of public justice, “[t]here is no place in [our criminal justice] regime for prosecutorial 
gamesmanship”). 
69. See infra Section II.B.3. 
70. See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (contending that people focus on the 
fairness of court procedures, rather than their results, when evaluating procedural justice) and other writings of 
his. 
71. See id. at 4–5; cf. AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 4 (2014) (describing how arbitrary contact with the criminal 
justice system led to non-engagement with the political system). 
72. Wasserman, supra note 46, at 485 (“Rules of procedure and rules of sport also share a similar purpose: to 
ensure outcomes are accepted as fair and legitimate, even by a losing party disappointed in the result, because of 
faith in the fairness and legitimacy of the framework.”). 
73. Id. at 485 (arguing that “[t]he quest for this level field means framework rules should not tip too far in one 
direction” and therefore “rulemakers must recalibrate rules, sometimes along arbitrary lines, when a particular 
situation tilts (or is perceived as tilting) too far in one direction”). 
74. Id. at 485–86. 
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II. CHARGES OF GAMESMANSHIP IN CRIMINAL LITIGATION AND IN SPORT 
Gamesmanship can be a tricky concept to precisely define. Knowing the rules of 
a game well and using them to one’s advantage are expected of litigators as much 
as they are of athletes in a sporting match. Advocating zealously and making stra-
tegic decisions is what we expect of all criminal litigators.75 At what point, how-
ever, might strategic deployment of procedural rules cross a line of acceptability 
and begin to undermine core values or fundamental goals of the system, whether in 
sport or in criminal litigation? To examine the concept more precisely, it is neces-
sary to look at specific examples of when charges of gamesmanship are made 
against competitors in both contexts. This Part looks at examples from the worlds 
of both sport and criminal practice. 
A. Charges of Gamesmanship in Sport 
Allegations of gamesmanship in sport fall into a few general categories. When a 
player violates a rule that is seen as central to the definition of the game itself, 
many feel that a line has been crossed and such conduct should be condemned. 
Violation of these constitutive rules can lead to charges that the offender is not 
even playing the game at all and so should not only be sanctioned but also disquali-
fied. Instances in which competitors detect a broader competitive advantage to los-
ing a particular match are not uncommon and can provoke outraged cries of poor 
sportsmanship and gamesmanship. Finally, the strategic and aggressive invocation 
of minor rules to confuse or disadvantage one’s opponent divides fans and players 
alike regarding whether such behavior is simply part of the game to be celebrated 
or a distraction to be condemned. Infamous (or brilliant) examples of each of these 
kinds of sporting behavior can be compared to similar behavior in the litigation 
context. 
1. Violating a Core Rule of the Game 
Those who only know one rule of soccer know that the players (other than the 
goalkeeper) are not allowed to use their hands. In the quarterfinal game of the 2010 
World Cup, Uruguay and Ghana were tied 1–1 in the final seconds of extra time 
when Ghanaian striker Dominic Adiyiah headed the ball past the Uruguayan 
keeper in what looked like a certain last-minute goal to win the game. Uruguayan 
striker Luis Suarez, standing on the goal line and unable to stop the ball with his 
head, reached up with both hands and knocked the ball away, a clear violation of 
soccer’s central rule.76 
See FIFA TV, World Cup Moments: Luis Suarez, YOUTUBE (May 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=8CcPELUFKKU. 
The referee immediately and correctly gave Suarez a red 
card, ejecting him from that game and the next, and awarded Ghana a penalty kick. 
75. See, e.g., CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION 4-1.2(b) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2019) (requiring 
defense counsel to serve as “loyal and zealous advocates for their clients”). 
76. 
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In an unforgettable ending, Ghanaian striker Asamoah Gyan missed the penalty 
kick in what was the last play of extra time, and Uruguay went on to win the pen-
alty kick shootout, advancing to the semifinals over Ghana.77 
See Jamie Doward, Luis Suarez is New World Cup Villain After ‘Hand of God’ Claim, GUARDIAN (July 3, 
2010), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/jul/04/luis-suarez-world-cup-villian-hand-of-god. 
After the game, Suarez was unrepentant and clear: he had intentionally stopped 
the ball with his hands because the alternative would have assured his opponent 
the victory. Rather than pretending that his use of hands was inadvertent or acci-
dental, Suarez declared, “I made the save of the tournament!”78 
Id.; see also Ian Chadband, World Cup 2010: Uruguay’s Luis Suarez Revels in Second Coming of Hand of 
God, TELEGRAPH (July 3, 2010), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/uruguay/7870586/World- 
Cup-2010-Uruguays-Luis-Suarez-revels-in-second-coming-of-Hand-of-God.html (explaining how Suarez went 
on in exultant fashion: “There was no alternative for me. This was the end of the World Cup and when I saw 
Gyan miss the penalty it was a great joy. I thought ‘it is a miracle.’ We were still alive.”); Paul Fletcher, Luis 
Suarez – Hero or Villain?, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2010), https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/paulfletcher/2010/07/ 
luis_suarez_hero_or_villain.html (providing one writer’s description of Suarez’s demeanor in the post-game 
interview: “The huge grin on his face as he spoke to reporters indicated in the clearest terms possible that he had 
no regrets about what he had done.”). 
Immediately a 
debate began about whether the consequence to Suarez and the Uruguayan team 
was too light and, on a more philosophical level, whether what he did should be 
considered cheating.79 The disciplinary committee of FIFA, the governing body of 
the World Cup, considered extending Suarez’s one-game suspension but decided 
against it.80 Uruguayan coach Oscar Tabarez argued strongly that, although Suarez 
had violated one of the rules of soccer, he did not cheat: “Saying we cheated 
Ghana is too harsh a word to use. . . . We also abide by what the referee did. It 
could have been a mistake. Yes, he stuck his hand out, but it’s not cheating.”81 
Others disagreed, arguing that Suarez’s action was so far beyond the acceptable 
limits of what is allowed that it should be considered cheating and should merit a 
more severe penalty.82 
See Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Ghana’s Black Stars Celebrated in Defeat While Handball Debate Rages, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 4, 2010), https://www.npr.org/sections/showmeyourcleats/2010/07/04/128300381/ 
ghana-s-black-stars-tour-soweto. 
The fact that it prevented Ghana from becoming the first 
African nation to advance to the semifinals added to the public outrage.83 Heated 
discussions took place over whether Suarez had violated FIFA’s code of fair play, 
which states, “Winning is without value if victory has been achieved unfairly or 
dishonestly. Cheating is easy, but brings no pleasure.”84 
A Credo to Live and Play By, FIFA (Aug. 26, 1997), https://www.fifa.com/news/credo-live-and-play- 
72003. 
Suarez himself appeared 
to justify his actions with a cost-benefit analysis: “The way in which I was sent off 
today was worth it.”85 In the wake of the incident, Ghana’s sports minister, Akua 
77. 
78. 
79. Chadband, supra note 78; Fletcher, supra note 78. 
80. Chadband, supra note 78. 
81. Doward, supra note 77. 
82. 
83. Chadband, supra note 78. 
84. 
85. Chadband, supra note 78. 
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Sena Dansua, called on FIFA to change its rules regarding intentional handballs, 
saying that Ghana had been “robbed” of its victory.86 
See Ghana Calls for Fifa Rule Change After World Cup Exit, BBC NEWS (July 7, 2010), https://www.bbc. 
com/news/10537133. 
Of course, one’s perspective on whether Suarez was a hero or a villain depended 
at least in part on one’s loyalty to one team or the other. Fans and teammates of 
Suarez defended and celebrated his decision while supporters of Ghana expressed 
outrage. While Uruguayan striker Diego Forlan said that Suarez had “made a great 
save” and was “one of the heroes,”87 Ghanaian defender John Pantsil was harshly 
critical of the move, declaring, “There is no chance that any of us Ghana[ian] play-
ers would have used our hand[s] to stop the ball—no way.”88 Beyond team loyalty, 
however, some proposed that views of the acceptability of Suarez’s move were 
culturally specific and that “[w]hat might be regarded in Europe or Africa as cheat-
ing is seen as cunning or exploitation of the rules in other parts of the world.”89 
The Suarez incident recalled another well-known intentional handball from the 
previous year when French captain Thierry Henry admitted that he had touched the 
ball with his hands to set up a game-winning goal by teammate William Gallas 
that knocked Ireland out of World Cup contention.90 
1095macho, Thierry Henry Handball Controversy France. vs Ireland, YOUTUBE (Nov. 21, 2009) https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCDZjtC3mug. 
Unlike the Suarez incident, 
however, the match officials did not see Henry’s violation and did not call a pen-
alty. Only after the game was over did Henry admit to the offense.91 As with the 
Suarez incident, public reaction was swift and furious. Debates raged about 
whether Henry’s action constituted cheating, and Henry claimed that he considered 
quitting soccer as a result of the uproar.92 
See Jack Bell, GOAL; Henry Considered Quitting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2009), https://archive.nytimes. 
com/query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage-9E0CE4D8103BF937A15752C1A96F9C8B63.html. 
The Irish government and others called 
for the result to be set aside and, alternatively, for Ireland to be awarded a special 
extra spot in the 2010 World Cup.93 
See Emmet Malone, One Night in Paris: Henry’s Stray Hand, the 33rd Team, and the Great Fifa 
Shakedown, IRISH TIMES (May 23, 2020), https://www.irishtimes.com/sport/soccer/international/one-night-in- 
paris-henry-s-stray-hand-the-33rd-team-and-the-great-fifa-shakedown-1.4260282. 
FIFA rejected these proposals, but the incident 
spurred an increase in the use of technology in officiating, leading to the addition 
of video-assistant-referee and goal-line technology to assist officials during 
matches.94 
See Fifa to Investigate Thierry Henry Handball, BBCSPORT: FOOTBALL (Dec. 2, 2009), http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/sport2/hi/football/internationals/8391388.stm. 
Similarly, FIFA considered and rejected rule changes after the 2010 
Suarez incident.95 
See World Cup 2010: Blatter Rules Out ‘Penalty Goals’ Following Suarez Handball Anger, SCOTSMAN 
(July 8, 2010), https://www.scotsman.com/sport/world-cup-2010-blatter-rules-out-penalty-goals-following- 
suarez-handball-anger-2481283. 
One proposal would have allowed a referee to award a goal in 
86. 
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cases where an intentional handball prevented what would have been an obvious 
goal.96 
Id. This would be similar to the rules of rugby, which allows for a goal to be awarded by the official when 
a player “would probably have scored . . . but for foul play by an opponent.” WORLD RUGBY, WORLD RUGBY 
LEISURE RUGBY LAWS: BEACH FIVES RUGBY 8 (2020), https://laws.worldrugby.org/?domain=7&modified_ 
form=5&language=EN. 
Unlike Luis Suarez, Thierry Henry was contrite and proposed that the game 
should be replayed: “Naturally I feel embarrassed at the way that we won and feel 
extremely sorry for the Irish who definitely deserve to be in South Africa [at the 
World Cup]. . . . It was an instinctive reaction to a ball that was coming extremely 
fast in a crowded penalty area.”97 
Laura Stevenson, Replay the Best Solution Says Henry, INDEPENDENT (November 20, 2009), https://www. 
independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/replay-the-best-solution-says-henry-1824593.html. 
Irish players and even the president of FIFA, 
Sepp Blatter, expressed sympathy for Henry.98 
See Blatter Breaks Silence to Reveal Henry Support, DAWN (Nov. 29, 2009), https://www.dawn.com/ 
news/929684; Malone, supra note 93. 
FIFA’s disciplinary committee 
opened an investigation into whether he should be suspended or otherwise penal-
ized for the handball but ultimately found no grounds to impose discipline on 
Henry.99 
See Fifa to Investigate Thierry Henry Handball, supra note 94; David Hytner, Thierry Henry Escapes 
Punishment for World Cup Handball, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/ 
jan/18/thierry-henry-fifa-handball-escapes-punishment. 
2. Losing on Purpose 
Tournament formats in many sports use the results of preliminary rounds to seed 
teams for the final knockout rounds. Occasionally, a team will qualify for the final 
knockout round and still have a preliminary round match to play, making the result 
relevant only to seeding. And on rare occasions, it will be to that team’s benefit to 
lose the match, giving the team a better chance to win in the final knockout round 
of the tournament.100 In truly remarkable cases, it will be in the interests of both 
teams to lose a match in the preliminary round, leading to some bizarre match 
behavior.101 
This was the case in the women’s doubles badminton competition at the 2012 
London Olympics.102 
See Olympics Badminton 2012 China vs Korea, YOUTUBE (Aug. 1, 2012) https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=H-bsqzlS-Gg (showing both teams intentionally serving faults into the net, prompting referee to tell 
teams to play properly or risk being thrown out of the tournament). 
Sixteen teams qualified for the tournament and eight would 
advance to the knockout round, with the seedings determined by performance in 





100. See PAPINEAU, supra note 2, at 86. A similar incentive exists in leagues that give the first-round draft 
pick to the team that finished last in the previous year. See infra, note 110 and accompanying text. 
101. One notorious variation of this was in the 1994 Barbados-Grenada soccer match. PAPINEAU, supra note 
2, at 88. The Barbados team needed to beat Grenada by two goals in order to advance to the finals. Because extra- 
time points counted as double for goal-differential purposes, Barbados tied the game by scoring on their own 
goal, defending both goals (so that Grenada could not choose to lose by one), and then defeating Grenada by a 
goal in extra-time. Id. at 88–89. 
102. 
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tournament and were hoping for gold and silver medals. But when the Danish team 
unexpectedly beat the favorites from China in the preliminary round, both Chinese 
teams appeared to be headed to the same side of the bracket, meaning that they 
would meet not in the finals but in the semifinals, so there would be no chance of 
winning both gold and silver. To avoid this result, one of the Chinese teams 
resolved to lose their final preliminary game against South Korea, after which they 
would be back on the opposite side of the bracket from the other Chinese team.103 
See Justin Peters, Shuttlecock and Bull, SLATE (Aug. 1, 2012), https://slate.com/culture/2012/08/ 
badminton-scandal-olympics-2012-why-were-those-olympic-badminton-players-trying-to-lose-and-why-is-the- 
sport-so-dirty.html. 
Once it became clear that the Chinese were trying to lose the match, the South 
Korean team decided that it would be to their advantage as well to lose the game. 
“As the crowd groaned and booed, the Chinese and South Korean players repeat-
edly served the birdie into or under the net, looking less competent than a bunch of 
Americans playing with a plastic Target badminton set at a backyard barbecue.”104 
Eventually the Chinese team managed to lose, but in a match later that day another 
South Korean team and a team from Indonesia came to the same mutual conclu-
sion: their chances of winning the tournament would be enhanced by losing the 
match. Amid widespread public outrage, all four teams were subsequently dis-
qualified from the Olympic competition for “conducting [themselves] in a manner 
that is clearly abusive or detrimental to the sport.”105 
Public opinion was split, with many agreeing that the players behaved in an 
unsportsmanlike manner and others arguing that they were shrewdly maximizing 
their chances of winning the ultimate prize: a gold medal. Many felt that the play-
ers had disrespected the game by not trying their hardest,106 while others argued 
that the athletes were simply employing the rules of the tournament to their advant-
age. The point, after all, was to win the tournament rather than a particular 
match.107 Professor David Papineau defends the athletes who purposely lost in 
these contexts, arguing that “the public should be grateful that the incompetence of 
the authorities was so clearly exposed.”108 
The idea of purposely losing a match to gain an advantage comes up with sur-
prising frequency, especially in multi-stage tournaments where seedings for final 
rounds depend upon results in preliminary rounds.109 The other notorious context 




106. See Olympics Badminton 2012 China vs Korea, supra note 102 (“They’re both trying to lose . . . and that 
is unforgivable.”). 
107. See PAPINEAU, supra note 2, at 86–87 (“[I]t was outrageous that the players should have their Olympic 
hopes shattered, just for doing their best to win the tournament.”). 
108. Id. at 88. 
109. Prominent examples include not only the Olympic badminton tournament described above but also the 
1982 World Cup soccer tournament between West Germany and Austria and the 1994 Barbados-Grenada soccer 
game. See id. at 86, 88. 
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when future draft picks are awarded to the teams with the worst records.110 
One particularly notorious example of this phenomenon was the 2006 “Bush Bowl,” in which the 
Houston Texans played the San Francisco Forty-Niners. If the Texans lost the game, they would ensure the worst 
record in the National Football League that season and, therefore, the first draft pick of the following year, when 
Heisman-winning Reggie Bush of the University of Southern California would be available. See John Branch, In 
Bush Bowl, Texans Lose, and Win, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/02/sports/ 
football/in-bush-bowl-texans-lose-and-win.html. Notwithstanding some controversy about incentivizing losses, 
the NFL still assigns draft picks in order of worst performance in the previous season. The Rules of the Draft, 
NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE: OPERATIONS, https://operations.nfl.com/the-players/the-nfl-draft/the-rules-of-the- 
draft/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2020). The National Basketball Association (NBA), by contrast, uses a weighted 
lottery for the worst teams, so a poorly performing team has little incentive to purposely lose games late in the 
season. See NBA Draft Lottery: Schedule, Odds and How It Works, NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nba.com/nba-draft-lottery-explainer. 
Both of 
these situations are easily remedied by administrative tinkering with the specific 
procedures and awarding of incentives. All final-round preliminary matches in the 
World Cup, for example, are now played simultaneously to reduce the potential for 
strategic losses in the final round.111 
See Kirsten Schlewitz, Why Are the Final Group Stage Matches at the World Cup Played 
Simultaneously?, SBNATION (Jun. 26, 2014), https://www.sbnation.com/soccer/2014/6/26/5843018/group- 
stages-2014-world-cup (describing the 1982 West Germany v. Austria strategic plan that caused public uproar 
and prompted the scheduling change). 
Other professional sports have turned to a 
weighted lottery system in drafting new players in order to avoid teams competing 
to have the worst record late in the season.112 
See, e.g., Ryan Nanni, It’s a Very Bad Time to be the Worst Team in the NBA, SBNATION (May 14, 
2019), https://www.sbnation.com/2019/5/14/18615941/nba-draft-lottery-history-worst-team-odds. In 1947 and 
1948, having the worst season record in the NBA unconditionally guaranteed a team the first pick in the draft. 
Between 1949 and 1965, draft picks were assigned in reverse order of record, but territorial picks allowed any 
team to forfeit its first-round pick at any time and instead claim any player within a 50-mile radius of the team’s 
home arena. Then, in 1966, the NBA’s lottery system was created. The system initially used a coin flip to 
determine whether the worst team from the East or the worst team from the West would get the first pick. The 
system did away with the coin flip in 1985. Instead, every team that missed the playoffs had a chance to be 
randomly selected to have first pick. Beginning in 1994, the NBA implemented the system that is still used today. 
The NBA now takes 14 ping-pong balls, assigning 25% of the possible combinations to the worst team, and 
draws four of them to determine which team gets first pick. Id. 
Losing on purpose turns out to be a 
form of gamesmanship easily addressed by changes to the governing rules. 
3. “Over-Enforcing” an Obscure Rule Against an Opponent 
It is no coincidence that legal scholars interested in procedure are drawn to base-
ball metaphors.113 The rules of baseball are full of arcane and little-known minu- 
tiae,114 
See, e.g., Emma Baccellieri, A Brief Guide to MLB’s Bizarre Uniform Guidelines, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(May 16, 2018), https://www.si.com/mlb/2018/05/16/mlb-uniform-guide-willson-contreras. 
waiting to be strategically deployed against an opponent. And while of 




113. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 58, at 1033 (“[T]he ‘sporting theory’ continues to infuse much of the 
business of our trial courts.”); Finkelman, supra note 13, at 239 (“[Y]ear after year, . . . the rhythm of baseball 
and the law continue to shape our world. . . . I believe that our legal culture, perhaps the very rule of law itself in 
the United States, is to some extent tied to our national past time.”); Yablon, supra note 44, at 229 (advancing the 
“radical” theory that “most of the advances in American legal theory have come from lawyers trying to figure out 
why the real legal system can’t be more like baseball”). 
114. 
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constitutive rules of baseball against an opponent during a game, managers will, 
on occasion, invoke the lesser-known rules of baseball to seek an advantage and be 
subject to cries of gamesmanship for their efforts. 
The Kansas City Royals were losing by a single run with two outs in the ninth 
inning in a July 1983 game at Yankee Stadium when George Brett, of the Kansas 
City Royals, came to the plate with a runner on base.115 When Brett hit Goose 
Gossage’s pitch out of the park into the right field seats, it looked like the Royals 
had taken the lead. But Billy Martin, the manager of the Yankees, came out of the 
dugout immediately after Brett’s hit and told the umpire that, because Brett’s bat 
had too much pine tar on its handle, the home run should be disallowed, and Brett 
should be called out. Then and now, Major League Baseball allows for pine tar to 
be used on the handle of the bat to improve the batter’s grip but, in order to main-
tain the cleanliness of the baseballs,116 
Steve Wulf, A Win for Common Sense, ESPN (July 24, 2013), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/ 
9498442/george-brett-pine-tar-game-common-sense-won-out. 
restricts the use of pine tar to the bottom 
eighteen inches of the bat. The officiating crew examined the bat, measured the 
length of the pine tar on the handle, and concluded that it exceeded the allowable 
length and therefore violated the rule.117 Because he had used an “illegal bat” 
according to the rules,118 Brett was ruled out, his home run nullified, and the game 
declared over with the Yankees having won by a run.119 
See id.; MLB, George Brett and the Pine Tar Incident, YouTube (May 9, 2013), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=gbEHAsZxRYo. 
Outrage ensued—at least outside of New York. The Royals appealed the deci-
sion and commentators lamented the clear gamesmanship of Billy Martin and the 
Yankees. The Royals petitioned American League president Lee MacPhail to 
reverse the decision because “the intent of the rule was not about competitive 
advantage but about keeping balls cleaner.”120 Likely not lost on MacPhail was the 
strategic decision by the Yankees to wait until after the home run to invoke the 
rule, seeming to show that their concern was not the cleanliness of the baseballs 
but in obtaining a competitive advantage. To great public celebration, MacPhail 
took the extremely unusual step of overturning the umpire’s decision, finding that, 
although the umpire had complied with the letter of the law in ruling Brett out, the 
decision was “not in accord with the intent or spirit of the rules.”121 MacPhail or-
dered that the Royals be credited with Brett’s two-run home run and that the game 
be resumed at a future date at Yankee Stadium.122 Columnist George Will’s 
115. Jared Tobin Finkelstein, In re Brett: The Sticky Problem of Statutory Construction, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 
430, 430 (1984). For an in-depth and entertaining analysis of the “pine tar incident,” see id. 
116. 
117. Id. at 430. 
118. See id. (stating that “the pine tar on Brett’s bat extended beyond the permissible eighteen-inch limit of 
the Official Baseball Rules”). 
119. 
120. Wulf, supra note 116. 
121. Finkelstein, supra note 115, at 435 (quoting Press Release, American League, Decision Regarding the 
Protest of the Game of Sunday (July 28, 1983)). 
122. Finkelstein, supra note 115, at 431. 
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relieved reaction to the decision spoke for many fans: “George Brett’s pine tar 
almost let the plague of modern life, lawyers, into the sole redeeming facet of mod-
ern life, baseball.”123 
MacPhail’s decision in the pine tar incident can be defended not only on textual 
grounds but also with regard to the broader purposes of the specific rule in question 
and, more generally, the rules of baseball.124 But just under the surface of his analy-
sis overturning the decision was a recognition that the Yankees had realized that 
Brett’s bat violated the rule and then waited until a strategically opportune time to 
register their objection. By ruling against the Yankees even though Brett’s bat did 
clearly and factually violate the rules, MacPhail undermined “a traditional mana-
gerial tactic—to use the rules to your best advantage.”125 Although some commen-
tators criticized the decision because “clever ploys and gambits are a part of the 
essence and history of baseball,”126 
Ira Berkow, The Eternal Pine Tar Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/ 
09/sports/sports-of-the-times-the-eternal-pine-tar-case.html. 
others lauded the decision on the grounds that 
“[g]ames are supposed to be decided by skills of players, not technicalities and 
loopholes.”127 Whether MacPhail’s decision upheld or undermined the best values 
of baseball depends, of course, on what those values are, and the pine tar incident 
demonstrated that not everybody agrees on that central question. 
***** 
As described above, one’s reaction to a particular charge of gamesmanship often 
depends on one’s pre-existing allegiance to the team or side engaged in the behavior. 
For every Royals fan in Kansas City who was appalled at the poor sportsmanship of 
the Yankees, there was a fan in New York celebrating the shrewd tactics of Billy 
Martin, the Yankees’ manager. But while some such behavior undermines the overall 
objectives of the contest, other examples can be understood to advance and refine 
those goals. By taking a broader perspective on the concept of gamesmanship and 
what different types of behavior can fall within this broad category, we can come to a 
clearer understanding of when it is desirable and when, on the other hand, it should be 
discouraged by amendment of the formal rules that allow it to exist. 
B. Allegations of Gamesmanship in Criminal Litigation 
Allegations of gamesmanship in criminal litigation fall into a few general cate-
gories, each broadly characterized as pursuing some objective that, while confer-
ring an advantage on the litigant, is peripheral to what is supposed to be the central 
goal of the litigation. Although they have not used the term expressly in this con-
text, several members of the Supreme Court have accused lawyers representing 
123. George Will, Such, Such Were the Joys, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1984, at 72. 
124. See Finkelstein, supra note 115, at 434, 437. 
125. Id. at 438. 
126. 
127. Peter Gammons, Off-Color Questions in Pine Tar Controversy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 26, 
1983, at 3C. 
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clients sentenced to death of a kind of gamesmanship in their litigation strategy. 
Most explicitly, Justice Thomas recently wrote that 
it is obvious that, for some who oppose capital punishment on policy grounds, 
the only acceptable end point . . . is for this Court . . . to strike down the death 
penalty as cruel and unusual in all circumstances. In the meantime, though, 
the next best option for those seeking to abolish the death penalty is to embroil 
the States in never-ending litigation concerning the adequacy of their execu-
tion procedures.128 
Justices Alito and Scalia have joined in this questioning of the true motives of those 
advocates raising constitutional challenges to methods of execution.129 Litigating 
whether a particular method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment is seen by some as a basic protection of a 
defendant’s rights and by others as an attempt to achieve an instrumental goal through 
means unrelated to the central merits of the issue.130 Some of the most frequent proce-
dural areas of criminal litigation have to do with discovery rights, disclosure by the 
government of evidence favorable to the defense, and jury selection. Disputes in each 
of these areas lead to charges of gamesmanship. 
1. Confrontation and Discovery Rights 
Criminal defendants possess a variety of procedural rights that are designed to 
lead to accurate and reliable results at trial, as well as to ensure the dignity and 
128. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 104–05 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 
2726, 2755 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“To the extent that we are ill at ease with these disparate outcomes, 
it seems to me that the best solution is for the Court to stop making up Eighth Amendment claims in its ceaseless 
quest to end the death penalty through undemocratic means.”). Ty Alper has disputed this interpretation, arguing 
that it is in fact lawyers for the state who are playing games in an attempt to manipulate the courts into denying 
valid Eighth Amendment challenges to methods of execution. See Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician 
Participation in Lethal Injection Executions, 88 N.C. L. REV. 11, 49–52 (2009) (arguing that state officials have 
“exaggerated their inability to find willing doctors” to participate in death penalty cases). 
129. See, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring) (declaring that arguments by anti-death 
penalty advocates about lengthy delays in carrying out executions “calls to mind the man sentenced to death for 
killing his parents, who pleads for mercy on the ground that he is an orphan”); Baze, 553 U.S. at 67 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“Although there has been a proliferation of litigation challenging current lethal injection protocols, 
evidence regarding alleged defects in these protocols and the supposed advantages of alternatives is strikingly 
haphazard and unreliable.”). 
130. Justice Scalia brought up concerns of gamesmanship with some frequency in his opinions. See, e.g., Sell 
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 193 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that gamesmanship could result from 
allowing a defendant to seek immediate review of a medication order when ordinarily that challenge is only 
available on appeal); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2010) (arguing, in the context of police 
interrogations, that the police can re-approach a suspect fourteen days after release because any “gamesmanship” 
of releasing and re-arresting suspects will have been dispelled); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140 
(2009) (requiring an objection at the time of sentencing on the basis of a breached plea agreement because 
otherwise a defendant could “game the system” and wait to see if the sentence is later satisfactory); Yeager v. 
United States, 557 U.S. 110, 131 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting issue preclusion is used to prevent 
“gamesmanship” of subsequent prosecutions that require defendants to “run the gantlet a second time”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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fairness of the proceeding. Invocation of these rights, however, can lead to claims 
of gamesmanship by prosecutors. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,131 the 
Supreme Court considered the impact of its newly invigorated Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence132 on the everyday prosecution of drug cases.133 Five years 
earlier, the Crawford v. Washington Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause prohibited the use of testimonial out-of-court statements 
against a defendant in a criminal case.134 Charged with distribution of cocaine, Mr. 
Melendez-Diaz objected at trial to the introduction into evidence of a certificate of 
laboratory analysis defining the substance in question as cocaine.135 The Supreme 
Court reversed Melendez-Diaz’s conviction and agreed with him that introduction 
of the certificate violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.136 
The Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz changed how courts conduct trials of 
drug offenses in most jurisdictions. Defendants and defense lawyers now had a 
new tool that could be used in challenging the government’s case: they could insist 
that the prosecution call a live witness to testify about the testing and nature of the 
substance in question and to undergo cross-examination on those topics. Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent in Melendez-Diaz described the majority opinion as offering a 
“windfall to defendants,” allowing factually guilty defendants to go free on techni-
cal grounds.137 This practice, Kennedy argued, did not advance the truth-seeking 
function of trials.138 If the lab analyst was unable for whatever reason to appear in 
person for trial, the defendant would walk free regardless of the existing quantum 
of evidence against him. 
The majority recognized the potential for this kind of defense strategy but pre-
dicted that defendants would not use this tactical advantage too frequently because 
of the prospect of angering judges.139 In response, the dissent argued that not only 
131. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
132. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (ruling that testimonial statements fall 
within the Confrontation Clause); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (refining the definition of 
“testimonial” within the meaning of statements made during police interrogations that therefore fall within the 
Confrontation Clause). 
133. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 305. 
134. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. 
135. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308–09. 
136. Id. at 329. 
137. See id. at 343 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
138. See id. at 331–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ruling is “divorced from . . . the underlying 
purpose of the [Confrontation] Clause” and “has vast potential to disrupt criminal procedures . . . .”). 
139. See id. at 328 (arguing that defense attorneys will be reluctant to exercise the newly-recognized right to 
confront because of a desire not to “antagonize the judge or jury by wasting their time with the appearance of a 
witness whose testimony defense counsel does not intend to rebut in any fashion”). Justice Kennedy argued 
against the idea that courts will punish defense attorneys for taking advantage of the Court’s ruling: 
[T]he Court’s speculation rests on the apparent belief that our Nation’s trial judges and jurors are 
unwilling to accept zealous advocacy and that, once “antagonize[d]” by it, will punish such advo-
cates with adverse rulings. The Court offers no support for this stunning slur on the integrity of the 
Nation’s courts.  
Id. at 352 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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would defendants be tempted to regularly employ these tactics, but defense counsel 
would also have an obligation to object when the prosecution failed to call the 
technician.140 
The consequences of Melendez-Diaz extend to many different kinds of cases, 
with prosecutors occasionally crying foul when defense lawyers raise creative 
objections based on the newly expanded confrontation rights. After one acquittal 
in a DUI case in which the trial judge excluded evidence of the breath test because 
the test operator did not testify, the chief prosecutor declared, “[i]t’s Christmas in 
July for criminal lawyers who represent drunk drivers.”141 States quickly 
responded to the decision by passing “notice-and-demand” statutes, requiring the 
defendant to make any objection well in advance of trial to allow prosecutors to 
secure the attendance of necessary witnesses.142 
Such claims can be based on statutory discovery rules as well as constitutional 
rights. In a federal criminal prosecution, a defendant is entitled to discovery 
through Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.143 Among other enti-
tlements, Rule 16 not only allows a defendant to “inspect” material documents but 
also allows him to do the same to “buildings or places” that are both within the 
government’s possession and control, and material to the preparation of the 
defense.144 For example, a typical drug-related prosecution ordinarily will involve 
disclosure of a certificate of analysis concluding that the substance in question is 
indeed illegal drugs along with, perhaps, some lab notes of the analyst who per-
formed the chemical testing.145 Occasionally, however, defense lawyers have 
tested the scope of Rule 16 and asked for disclosure and inspection of documents 
and items not routinely disclosed. 
In United States v. Curtis,146 for instance, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals addressed a defense request for broad disclosure under Rule 16.147 In 
Curtis, the defendants, who had been charged in connection with the alleged sale 
140. See id. at 353–54 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
141. Joseph King, Chris Leibig, & Kristen D. Clardy, Melendez-Diaz and Briscoe: Return of Constitutional 
Guarantees Worth the Cost to the System, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 289, 290–91 (2010) 
(quoting Tom Jackman & Rosalind S. Helderman, Kaine Calls Session to Amend Laws on Trial Testimony, 
WASH. POST, July 23, 2009, at B1). 
142. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-95(g) (West 2020). The Melendez-Diaz Court seemed to encourage 
the creation of such statutes. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326 (explaining that “notice-and-demand statutes 
require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at 
trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence” 
unless the analyst testifies and noting that such statutes are likely constitutional). 
143. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (detailing information subject to disclosure). 
144. Id. 
145. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307–08 (describing drug testing process, including notarized 
“certificates of analysis”). 
146. 755 A.2d 1011 (D.C. 2000). Although I was not involved in the Curtis appeal, the defendant was 
represented by lawyers in my office, the Georgetown Criminal Justice Clinic. 
147. Although the litigation addressed the District of Columbia’s Rule 16, the Court noted that its rule is 
“substantially the same as its federal counterpart” and “is to be construed consistently with the federal rule.” Id. 
at 1014. 
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of heroin, were given the discovery that was “customarily provided before trial in 
narcotics cases”148: a chain of custody report and a certificate of analysis contain-
ing the analyst’s conclusion that the substance seized from the defendants was her-
oin. The defendants sought additional discovery not relating specifically to the 
analysis of the charged substances in their cases, but rather to the maintenance 
and repair records of the scientific instruments used in the analysis. They also 
requested training materials and testing protocols concerning the laboratory’s 
methods. When the prosecution refused to comply with these requests, the 
defendants filed a motion to compel discovery, which the trial court granted. 
The prosecution then refused to comply with the court order and the trial court 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the charges as a sanction for the gov-
ernment’s noncompliance.149 
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the trials court’s 
dismissal of the cases because the trial court had made no specific findings con-
cerning whether the evidence sought was material to the preparation of the defense. 
The Court remanded the case to the trial court to make these findings but also 
stated that, to prevail, the defendants “must make some preliminary showing of a 
reason to doubt the chemical analysis provided by the government.”150 Although 
the appellate court ultimately reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the cases, in 
the months leading up to that reversal, the underlying litigation led to many drug 
cases being dismissed for violations of Rule 16 when defense lawyers began filing 
similar discovery requests in every drug case.151 Among the various trial courts 
handling drug cases, several judges took the position that Rule 16 required such 
disclosure and several other judges disagreed. Whether a drug case was dismissed 
prior to trial, therefore, became largely a function of which judge was presiding. 
With the many pre-trial dismissals came claims from prosecutors that defense law-
yers were just engaged in gamesmanship: that they were not interested in actually 
obtaining the discovery that they requested under Rule 16, but instead were simply 
interested in provoking a dismissal based on the government’s refusal to comply with 
a pre-trial order to compel discovery. Such arguments were a prelude to claims by 
prosecutors after Melendez-Diaz152 that defense lawyers would exercise their newly 
recognized procedural rights in a way that had nothing to do with the search for the 
truth but would simply drive up the costs of prosecuting crimes and lead to dismissals 
based on “technical” violations of the Confrontation Clause. 
Did the defendants in Curtis and the hundreds of other drug cases in that juris-
diction in which similar discovery requests were made seek the requested 
148. Id. at 1012. 
149. Id. at 1013–14. 
150. Id. at 1015. 
151. My description of this period—here and in the succeeding paragraphs in this Subsection—is based on 
my firsthand experience as a defense lawyer practicing in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia at this 
time. 
152. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
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discovery solely to test the strength of the government’s evidence and establish 
reasonable doubt as to whether the government had proven each element of its 
case? Or were the defense lawyers reacting to a procedural ruling that, without 
regard to the factual merit of the case, would lead to a dismissal of the charges? 
There is certainly a colorable claim to be made that the maintenance records and 
training protocols could “lead to other admissible evidence, assist the defendant in 
the preparation of witnesses or in corroborating testimony, or be useful as 
impeachment or rebuttal evidence.”153 But any defendant charged with such a 
crime—even one who may have admitted to law enforcement that the substance in 
question is in fact illegal drugs—is similarly entitled to request discovery in this 
way. And, until the appellate court in that jurisdiction restricted the trial courts’ 
reading of Rule 16, any defense lawyer who did not make such a request would not 
be providing effective assistance of counsel. 
2. Disclosure of Favorable Evidence 
Allegations of gamesmanship in criminal litigation flow both ways, of course, 
and just as prosecutors sometimes complain about defendants’ active exercise of 
their procedural rights to discovery and to confront witnesses against them, defense 
lawyers often complain about gamesmanship in the disclosure of Brady154 material 
by prosecutors.155 In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors 
have an obligation to disclose to the defense evidence that is favorable to the 
accused and material to the outcome of the case.156 Subsequent cases, however, 
have restricted this right and created numerous doctrines that can make what 
seemed like a command into more of a suggestion.157 Because of the numerous 
decisions cutting back on the promise of Brady, especially by restricting the defini-
tion of what evidence is material and therefore within the scope of the requirement, 
a prosecutor so inclined can withhold favorable evidence with little fear of 
consequence.158 
153. Curtis, 755 A.2d at 1015. 
154. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
155. See Gershman, supra note 11, at 533 (“[N]o rule in criminal procedure . . . has generated as much 
gamesmanship[] as the Brady rule.”). 
156. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
157. See Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady Through the Defendant 
Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138, 158 (2012) (explaining how the “defendant due diligence rule” 
suggests that the government’s Brady obligations are not absolute and encourages suppression of exculpatory 
evidence by shifting the burden of discovery onto the defendant); Gershman, supra note 11, at 548 (discussing 
suppression of evidence through misleading open-file policies); Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and 
Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 659 (2002) (explaining how 
the realities of the criminal justice system, particularly the high rates of pleas, make the Brady requirement 
“more of a post-trial due process safety check” rather than a pre-trial discovery mechanism). 
158. Gershman, supra note 11, at 531, 549 (“[A]s interpreted by the judiciary, Brady actually invites 
prosecutors to bend, if not break, the rules, and many prosecutors have become adept at Brady gamesmanship to 
avoid compliance.”). 
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Examples of prosecutorial gamesmanship in this context include the avoidance 
of overt and explicit promises of rewards to cooperating witnesses so neither the 
prosecutor nor the witness need disclose the existence of an agreement;159 the pur-
poseful decision to avoid creating any Brady material so there is nothing to dis-
close;160 the disclosure of material at the last minute;161 and the disclosure of a 
single piece of favorable evidence amid an avalanche of less consequential evi-
dence in the hopes that the defense will fail to recognize the significance of the 
Brady material.162 
Id. at 548. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Federal Prosecutors Discussed “Burying” Evidence in Troubled 
New York Case, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 6, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/06/887297768/federal- 
prosecutors-discussed-burying-evidence-in-troubled-new-york-case (revealing email correspondence between 
prosecutors in which one referred to an important piece of evidence favorable to the defense and wrote to the 
other, “I’m wondering if we should wait until tomorrow and bury it in some other documents.”); cf. Babcock, 
supra note 16, at 142–45 (recounting the thought process of prosecutors when asked to open their files to the 
defendant); Weisburd, supra note 157, at 175–78 (criticizing the due diligence rule as not taking into account the 
differing resources between prosecutors and defense lawyers). 
An extreme version of Brady gamesmanship occurs when a 
prosecutor enters into an agreement with an attorney for a cooperating witness but 
agrees that neither lawyer will reveal to the cooperating witness either the details 
or even the existence of the agreement.163 
While Brady seemed on its face to embrace a move away from adversarialism, 
in practice it has accomplished very little.164 Brady on its face appeared to mark “a 
potentially revolutionary shift from traditionally unfettered adversarial combat to-
ward a more inquisitorial, innocence-focused system.”165 Because other aspects of 
the criminal adjudication system, however, remained adversarial, most observers 
would agree that Brady has had little effect on how criminal cases are tried.166 This 
is an example of behavioral norms—as well as formal financial and other incentive 
structures—being more powerful than formal procedural rules.167 
Courts have at times referred critically to prosecutors’ gamesmanship in dealing 
with Brady.168 With the curtailing of the doctrine in subsequent cases, however, 
159. Id. at 540. 
160. See id. at 551. 
161. Id. at 560–62. 
162. 
163. Gershman, supra note 11, at 538–40. 
164. See Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for 
Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 129 (Carol Steiker ed., 2005). 
165. Id. 
166. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4, 29 (2015) (“[S]ince its inception, the 
[Brady] doctrine has attracted sharp criticism.”); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 685, 708 (2006); Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of 
Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 644 (2002). 
167. Bibas, supra note 164, at 141 (“Simple exhortations to be neutral or pursue justice cannot transform our 
adversarial system into an inquisitorial one. The traditions, culture, and incentives of our adversarial system are 
deeply rooted and hard to change.”). 
168. See Gershman, supra note 11, at 531 n.4 (citing United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 
1984) (“This court has been faced with annoying frequency with gamesmanship by some prosecutors with 
respect to the duty to disclose.”) and United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The [Brady] 
game will go on, but justice will suffer.”)). 
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appellate courts often lack the authority to require prosecutors to meaningfully dis-
close evidence that would be helpful to a defendant.169 Because the doctrine has 
evolved in a way to make actionable Brady violations rare, and because discipli-
nary authorities have been reluctant to take action against prosecutors who have 
failed to disclose favorable evidence,170 strategic nondisclosure by prosecutors 
remains a frequent complaint of defense lawyers.171 
3. Jury Selection 
Any first-year law student can recite the importance and the sanctity of the jury 
in America’s criminal justice system. The criminal jury serves as an “inestimable 
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, 
biased, or eccentric judge.”172 With a pedigree tracing back to Magna Carta, crimi-
nal trial by jury was a motivating factor in the very founding of the country.173 Of 
course, the importance of the criminal jury right is codified in the Sixth 
Amendment174 as well as in Article III of the Constitution itself.175 And for well 
over a century, the right to trial by jury has been recognized as an important protec-
tion against racial discrimination.176 
Of course, just as any first-year law student can recite the theory behind the right 
to trial by jury, any first-year trial lawyer can recite the conventional wisdom and 
cynical truth of jury selection: trial lawyers routinely strike jurors on the basis of 
race.177 Probably the most notorious embrace of race-conscious jury selection is 
the 1987 training video made for new Philadelphia prosecutors178 
Jury Selection with Jack McMahon All 1 Hour and 1 Minute, YOUTUBE (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=Ag2I-L3mqsQ. 
in the wake of 
169. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114 (1976) (providing that a prosecutor’s failure to 
provide evidence to defense counsel does not deprive a defendant of a fair trial because defense counsel did not 
specifically request such evidence nor did the evidence involved perjury). 
170. See Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 521 (2011) (“[E]ven where cases go to trial and prosecutorial misconduct is 
established on appeal, it is rarely found to constitute harmful—and therefore reversible—error. . . . Prosecutors 
are almost never subjected to professional discipline-even where the misconduct constitutes harmful error.”). 
171. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Why Do Brady Violations Happen?: Cognitive Bias and Beyond, 37 CHAMPION 
12, 12–13 (2013) (discussing the “[s]cores of defense lawyer accounts of intentional Brady failures”). 
172. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
173. See id. at 151–52 (“[B]y the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal cases had been in 
existence . . . for several centuries and carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta.”). 
174. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury. . . .”). 
175. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury . . . .”). 
176. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880) (answering the question of whether “every 
citizen of the United States has a right to a trial of an indictment against him by a jury selected and impanelled 
[sic] without discrimination against his race or color” in the affirmative). 
177. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the 
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2011) (noting 
that “virtually every commentator (and numerous judges) who have studied the issue have concluded that race- 
based juror strikes continue to plague American trials”). 
178. 
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky.179 In the training video, 
Assistant District Attorney and experienced prosecutor Jack McMahon encouraged 
the new prosecutors to empanel juries as “unfair” as they possibly could, specifi-
cally instructing them to strike African Americans from their juries.180 McMahon 
went on to instruct the new prosecutors on how to get around the new constitu-
tional restrictions against race-based peremptory strikes: 
When you do have a black juror, question them at length. And on this little 
sheet that you have, mark something down that you can articulate later if 
something happens . . . and question them and say, “Well the woman had a kid 
about the same age as the defendant and I thought she’d be sympathetic to 
him,” or “She’s unemployed and I just don’t like unemployed people.” . . . So, 
sometimes under that line you may want to ask more questions of those people 
so it gives you more ammunition to make an articulable reason as to why you 
are striking them, not for race.181 
Although the McMahon training video may be remarkable for its candor, 
many think the sentiments expressed and tactics suggested by him are 
commonplace.182 
Peremptory challenges allow for any party to a criminal trial to strike a certain 
number of potential jurors who are otherwise qualified, without stating a reason.183 
Although sometimes questioned and criticized by scholars and judges,184 peremp-
tory challenges are still allowed by every state185 and the federal system.186 The 
Supreme Court has approved the use of peremptory challenges and has cited their 
long historical pedigree and widespread use in American jurisdictions as demon-
strating “the long and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary 
179. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
180. See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 177, at 1078–79 (“Let’s face it . . . there’s the blacks from the low- 
income areas . . . you don’t want those people on your jury. . . . You know, in selecting blacks, again, you don’t 
want the real educated ones . . . [I]n my experience, black women, young black women, are very bad.”) (quoting 
Jury Selection with Jack McMahon All 1 Hour and 1 Minute, supra note 178, at 39:15). 
181. See Jury Selection with Jack McMahon All 1 Hour and 1 Minute, supra note 178, at 57:50. 
182. See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2247 (2019) (“On average . . . the State asked 29 
questions to each struck black prospective juror. The State asked an average of one question to each seated white 
juror.”). 
183. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). 
184. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision today will not end the racial 
discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by 
eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 272 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (urging the reconsideration of Batson because “[i]f used to express stereotypical judgments about 
race, gender, religion, or national origin, peremptory challenges betray the jury’s democratic origins and 
undermine its representative function”); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A 
Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 812 (1997) (“I have come to realize that the very notion of 
peremptory challenges is in hopeless conflict with our ideals of what an impartial jury is and how it should be 
selected.”). 
185. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-105(a) (West 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.08(1) (West 2020); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-313(a)(1) (West 2020). 
186. FED. R. CRIM. P 24(b). 
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part of trial by jury.”187 Although traditionally a peremptory challenge could be 
exercised for any reason, the Supreme Court held in Batson v. Kentucky that a law-
yer may not exercise peremptory challenges in a manner motivated by race.188 The 
potential for gamesmanship in the jury selection process, and for the use of pe-
remptory challenges to skew the racial makeup of a jury based on pretextual rea-
sons, was foreseen by Justice Marshall at the time of the Batson decision, in which 
he argued that peremptory strikes should no longer be allowed in criminal trials.189 
A chronic complaint of litigants in the criminal justice system is that their opponent 
is using race-based strikes to exclude jurors of a particular ethnicity. Much evidence 
exists to show that prosecutors and defense lawyers do take race and gender into 
account when exercising their peremptory challenges.190 Indeed, the Batson rule is 
seen as one of the most frequently violated rules of constitutional criminal proce-
dure.191 As with the Brady context discussed above, the Supreme Court opened the 
door for gamesmanship in the Batson context when, a decade after the initial decision, 
it held in Purkett v. Elem that a lawyer need only provide a race-neutral—not neces-
sarily a plausible—reason for a strike to survive the initial stage of a Batson chal-
lenge.192 Any lawyer can insulate a peremptory challenge from meaningful review by 
articulating a race-neutral reason, however absurd, or by relying on behavior by the 
struck juror that would not appear in the trial record.193 
Using race as a basis for exercising peremptory strikes violates a clear rule and 
therefore could more properly be characterized as cheating than gamesmanship. 
Because the enforcement mechanism established by the Supreme Court in Batson 
and Purkett has made it so difficult to establish such a violation and obtain a rem-
edy, however, such behavior continues to be a significant part of criminal litiga-
tion. Violations of the rule against using race in this way generally result only in 
the potential juror being seated on the jury (if before trial) or the conviction being 
reversed (if after trial) but not in professional discipline for the lawyer found to 
187. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). 
188. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. This holding was extended to cover peremptory challenges by the defendant in 
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992), and was further extended to include gender-based peremptory 
challenges in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994). 
189. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to 
distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to 
ban them entirely from the criminal justice system.”). 
190. See David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner, & Barbara Broffitt, The 
Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
3, 52–53, 73, n.197 (2001) (finding that prosecutors struck 51% of Black jurors in a sample and that race-based 
uses of prosecutorial peremptories declined by only 2% after Batson); Jury Selection with Jack McMahon All 1 
Hour and 1 Minute, supra note 178. 
191. See Baldus, et. al., supra note 190, at 73, n.197 (explaining a study that found race-based uses of 
prosecutorial peremptories declined by only 2% after Batson). 
192. 514 U.S. 765, 768–69 (1995). 
193. See, e.g., Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial Tribulations, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 713, 
719–20 (2018) (“Anyone with even a modicum of savvy can choose a justification that is not observable on the 
record— such as the claim that the juror was not making good eye contact—thereby making it impossible for 
trial judges, and later appellate judges, to disprove the justification.”); Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 177, at 1093. 
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have engaged in this practice.194 Because a peremptory strike is so easily defended 
against a Batson challenge by citing some race-neutral reason, and because the sys-
tem seems to largely tolerate this behavior, the practice of race-based strikes is 
more usefully analyzed as a form of gamesmanship than as an example of 
cheating. 
***** 
These are just a few of the most commonly cited examples of gamesmanship in 
criminal litigation. Of course, gamesmanship is in the eye of the beholder and 
some will see nothing remotely troubling in these examples. Other strategic litiga-
tion decisions are so commonplace that many do not view them as gamesmanship. 
In some criminal justice systems, for example, delay has become such a central 
part of strategic decision-making by defendants and prosecutors that it seems to 
escape notice as a litigation tactic. In her book Misdemeanorland, Professor Issa 
Kohler-Hausmann describes how prosecutors can use pretrial delay and detention 
to achieve goals unrelated to the merits of the criminal charges. In her description 
of low-level courts in New York City, conviction is not even the central goal of 
prosecutors as much as the marking, monitoring, and social control of those people 
brought into criminal court.195 The statutory speedy trial guarantee, generally 
understood as a protector of defendants’ rights, operates in Kohler-Hausmann’s 
account as a tool in the hands of the prosecutors, allowing them to keep a case 
open long enough to coerce certain actions by the defendant regardless of the mer-
its of the case.196 The book is full of examples of actors on both sides using the 
delay that is endemic to the system to engineer outcomes unrelated to the legal or 
factual guilt of the defendant.197 Such behaviors have become such constant fea-
tures of the architecture of the system, however, that they can escape critical atten-
tions as examples of strategic behavior and gamesmanship. 
III. GAMESMANSHIP, CHEATING, AND HOW TO RESPOND 
In criminal litigation, as in sports, gamesmanship forces to the surface those val-
ues and qualities that are considered essential to the adversarial process. Strategic 
194. See, e.g., Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 177, at 1099–1102 (describing the rarity of successful post-trial 
Batson challenges). 
195. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 12, at 5 (“[C]riminal courts are using tools for social control work. . 
. . [S]ocial control in misdemeanorland is primarily sought through three primary techniques that I call 
‘marking,’ ‘procedural hassle,’ and ‘performance.’”). 
196. See id. at 204 (“The statutory time allowed to prosecute a case is therefore not only a guarantee to the 
defendant of a speedy trial or resolution, it is a tool that allows the state to engage the defendant in a series of 
encounters with state authority.”). 
197. See, e.g., id. at 201–02 (describing a scenario in which the defense attorney used delay to the benefit of 
their client); see also Alexandra Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal Justice, 128 YALE L.J. 1648, 
1690 (2018) (“Prosecutors took advantage of court delays, postponements, and the requirement that defendants 
be physically present at every court date to pressure defendants to plead.”). Natapoff provides a description of 
how the entire misdemeanor system (at least in New York) might be engaged in a kind of gamesmanship to 
encourage waivers of rights and resolution through guilty pleas. See generally id. 
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behavior in litigation necessarily brings about a discussion regarding which qual-
ities we truly value in the criminal justice system and clarifies the boundaries 
within which the process plays out. To understand how discussions from sports can 
illuminate the criminal litigation context, it is important to clearly define games-
manship, distinguish the concept from cheating, and examine how sports author-
ities have responded to allegations of gamesmanship that were seen as detrimental 
to the sport. 
A. Gamesmanship Defined 
Gamesmanship forces those who care about a system to clarify what the rules 
should specifically allow and forbid. By reflecting on these concepts, we refine our 
ideal boundaries and make plain the values of the criminal justice system. Do we 
want to define the role of the prosecutor, for example, as one who affirmatively 
seeks out particular evidence helpful to the defense, or do we prefer a prosecutorial 
role that simply makes available all evidence to the defense without reference to 
what might be particularly helpful? Or do we instead prefer a system of relatively 
pure adversarialism, where the prosecutor has no obligation to disclose any favor-
able evidence? 
Those who have looked at the issue of gamesmanship from a philosophical per-
spective come to at least a half-hearted defense of the practice. Unlike cheating, 
true gamesmanship by definition exists not outside of the formal rules but within 
the rules themselves. True gamesmanship depends on the rules for its very exis-
tence. Our system of criminal procedure evolves and develops only by individual 
litigants asserting rights and pressing creative legal arguments. The system suc-
ceeds in achieving its goals (including those of accurate fact-finding and just out-
comes) only by aggressive application of procedural rules by lawyers.198 A system 
without aggressive policing of the rules, especially by defense lawyers, would lead 
increasingly to unclear procedures and inaccurate (and unfair) outcomes.199 
Not only can the practice be justified as acceptable in the criminal litigation con-
text, but many also defend it as socially productive within the world of sport. 
Defending what she terms actions of “weak” gamesmanship, such as baseball 
pitchers purposely throwing inside and the strategic withholding of information 
about player injuries and likely lineups, philosopher Leslie A. Howe argues that 
such tactics advance the ultimate goals of sport and should, in fact, be welcomed: 
198. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 535 (2006) (referring to “our 
systemic overdependence upon individual defendants and their attorneys to proctor the criminal justice system”). 
199. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 
YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1997) (describing how rules of criminal procedure “extensively regulate[] the conduct of 
various actors in the system, ranging from police officers and prosecutors to defense attorneys and court 
personnel” and arguing that the rules “depend for their enforcement on an adequate level of litigation by 
defendants, meaning in practice by defense counsel”). 
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Provided that a tactic is compatible with the rules of a given sport and with the 
aims of sport in general, there seems no prima facie reason to discourage it. If 
it enhances or furthers these aims, . . . that seems prima facie a good reason to 
encourage it.200 
Similarly, David Papineau defends those badminton players who tried to purposely 
lose a match in order to improve their chances of winning the tournament, arguing 
that their actions only exposed an irrationality that existed in the rules of the tour-
nament and should be fixed.201 The clear exposure of flawed or outdated rules ben-
efits the system by making plain that changes are needed. 
The same can be said of gamesmanship in the context of criminal litigation, as 
long as we are careful to define the term to include those tactics that are within the 
rules of procedure and ethics and are consistent with the ultimate goals of the crim-
inal justice system.202 These goals, of course, encompass more than simply the fac-
tually accurate resolution of disputes. They also include normative expressions of 
community judgment, procedural safeguards for the defendant, and respect for the 
individual rights of those involved in the process. 
B. Gamesmanship Distinguished from Cheating 
To define the idea of gamesmanship in a way that is both clear and useful, we 
must clarify what it is not: cheating is importantly different and theoretically easier 
to deal with than gamesmanship. A prosecutor who knowingly presents the testi-
mony of a lying witness or a coach who bribes an official presents an ethically 
uncomplicated case, and that conduct would be universally condemned as cheat-
ing. Professor Howe defines gamesmanship as 
the attempt to gain competitive advantage either by an artful manipulation of 
the rules that does not actually violate them or by the psychological manipula-
tion or unsettling of the opponent (or sometimes the officials), whether this be 
200. Howe, supra note 1, at 221. Howe goes further: 
A case can be made that certain forms of (weak) gamesmanship are indeed required—it would be 
wrong not just athletically but also morally not to employ them, because to withhold such actions 
is disrespectful of the opponent—it implies that the other competitor is not significant enough to 
warrant one’s full attention.  
Id. 
201. PAPINEAU, supra note 2, at 87 (“I thought it was outrageous that the players should have their Olympic 
hopes shattered, just for doing their best to win the tournament. What did the organizers expect, if they didn’t 
have the sense to organize a competition properly? The hazards of group-knockout competitions are well known. 
If anybody betrayed the Olympic spirit, it was the incompetent badminton authorities, not the players.”). 
202. Because of the asymmetrical nature of criminal litigation, however, the sports metaphor can only go so 
far. Unlike sporting events, we assign different roles to the defense lawyer and the prosecutor, and we ask the 
prosecutor not simply to win the case but to see that justice is done. Due to this structural preference in criminal 
litigation, it is possible that gamesmanship on the part of the prosecutor is less defensible than a similar tactic 
employed by the defendant. See supra Section I.C (describing the limits of the analogy between law and sport, 
including the different institutional roles assigned to the prosecutor and defense attorney). 
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by intimidation, nondisclosure of information, outright deception, or the first 
alternative (instrumental use of the rules).203 
Cheating, on the other hand, is “the intentional violation of a public system of rules 
to secure the goals of that system for oneself or for those for whom one is con-
cerned.”204 Cheating is considered wrong and unacceptable not only because it vio-
lates an implicit promise but also because the behavior, if universally adopted, 
would destroy the system of rules and the broader purpose that those rules serve.205 
The distinction between gamesmanship and cheating—and the reasons one 
might be celebrated, or at least tolerated, while the other condemned—gets at the 
very idea of what sport is. Sport only exists if there is a possibility of failure, of one 
side winning and the other losing.206 Without this element, there is no true sporting 
contest.207 
Psychology of Losing, EXACTSPORTS (Aug. 14, 2011), https://exactsports.com/blog/psychology-of- 
losing/2011/08/14/ (stating that “[i]n all sporting events there is a winner and a loser,” and that the desire to win 
is the primary reason for some athletes’ participation in sports). 
If sport is defined by the possibility of failure, the same is true of a crim-
inal trial. Where no risk of losing exists, no jeopardy has attached and no trial has 
occurred in any realistic sense.208 
See, e.g., People v. Aleman, 667 N.E.2d 615, 624–25 (Ill. 1996) (providing that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause did not bar retrial after acquittal in a case where the defendant had bribed the judge to obtain the 
acquittal). Similarly, when asked about trying enemy combatants in the regular American criminal court system, 
Jack Goldsmith, responded, “Another reason why you might not want to use the trial system [is] [b]ecause the 
trial system, to be legitimate, has to be able to have the possibility of acquitting someone of the crime.” 
Transcript: After Guantanamo, NOW ON PBS (Sept. 4, 2009), https://www.pbs.org/now/shows/536/transcript. 
html. 
When forms of gamesmanship in either context 
simply invalidate the competition and are clearly indefensible, they are more akin 
to cheating. The more interesting cases are those such as the “professional foul,” 
which Howe defines as “an action that is explicitly contrary to the rules of the com-
petition, but . . . committed openly, with the player accepting . . . the legal punish-
ment for it.”209 
Cheating occurs when a participant in a contest fails to accept the legitimacy of 
the rules and the restrictions placed upon the competitors by the nature of those 
rules. “One can have various personal ends in view when playing a particular 
game. But whatever these ends, one thing is clear: One’s means for achieving these 
ends are importantly limited in ways they would not be in a more purely ‘technical’ 
exercise.”210 Failing to observe and acquiesce to these limits is called cheating, at 
least in a strictly formalist sense. One pure formalist view argues that someone 
203. Howe, supra note 1, at 213. 
204. ROBERT L. SIMON, CESAR R. TORRES & PETER F. HAGER, FAIR PLAY: THE ETHICS OF SPORT 60 (4th ed. 
2014) (emphasis added) (citing BERNARD GERT, MORALITY: ITS NATURE AND JUSTIFICATION 198 (1998)). 
205. See id. (“The distinctive element in the general presumption that cheating is wrong is that the cheater 
behaves in a way that no one could rationally or impartially recommend that everyone in the activity emulate; 
that is why the public system of rules prohibits it in the first place.”). 
206. See Babcock, supra note 16, at 1141. 
207. 
208. 
209. Howe, supra note 1, at 212. 
210. Fred D’Agostino, The Ethos of Games, 8 J. OF THE PHIL. OF SPORT 7, 8 (1981). 
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who purposely violates a rule of a game is no longer playing that game. Some 
argue that it is impossible to cheat and to still be playing a game.211 
But this formalist view leaves unexplained the difference between playing a 
game and playing a game fairly. As scholar Fred D’Agostino argues: 
[A] formalist account of games effaces the distinction in ordinary language 
between playing and playing fairly (i.e., according to the rules). Against for-
malism, we might maintain . . . that “it seems more reasonable to say that the 
cheater is not playing fairly than that he is not playing at all.”212 
Alternatively, a formalist might take the position that there can be no cheating at a 
game if a specified sanction within the game is dictated by the formal rules for a 
particular action. The sanction, then, could be considered a price to be paid in 
exchange for taking a particular action, rather than something that is against the 
rules.213 
D’Agostino suggests that our ordinary intuitions tell us that neither explanation 
of cheating is adequate nor satisfying. What is missing from either formalist 
account of the idea of cheating is the explanatory power of a game’s ethos and the 
possibility that a player might forgo a legal tactic because it seems inappropriate or 
contrary to the spirit of the game.214 One of the limits of formalism in its ability to 
explain behavior is its failure to account for informal norms of conduct.   
211. See BERNARD SUITS, THE GRASSHOPPER: GAMES, LIFE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1978) (“To play a game is to 
attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs . . . using only means permitted by the rules . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
id. at 25 (“It is impossible for me to win the game and at the same time to break one of its rules.”). 
212. D’Agostino, supra note 210, at 9 (quoting Michael Quinn, Practice-Defining Rules, 86 ETHICS 76, 80 
(1975)). 
213. See Berman, Let ‘em Play, supra note 45, at 1347 n.66. Berman also cites the philosophical literature on 
whether intentional fouling can be considered breaking the rules or unethical, and he suggests that fouls are not 
actually prohibited by the rules of basketball. Rather than banning fouls, the rules of basketball simply impose a 
price for their use. Berman illustrates this idea: 
If you drive southward from Marin County over the Golden Gate Bridge, you will be compelled to 
pay a toll on the far side. That toll is not a penalty, and your driving into San Francisco is not pro-
hibited. The toll . . . is a price exacted for permitted conduct, not a penalty or sanction imposed for 
prohibited conduct.  
Id. 
214. Making this distinction, D’Agostino argues: 
This alternative account of penalties suggests that the only rational motive a participant in [a 
game] might have for refraining from [a prohibited behavior] is that engaging in such behavior is 
likely to be technically inefficient since it is likely to be penalized. But, surely, participants in [a 
game] often refrain from [prohibited behavior] not for reasons of technical efficiency, but because 
they believe that engaging in [that prohibited behavior] is, by and large, inappropriate in the con-
text of [the game]. It is the inappropriateness, rather than the technical inefficiency of penalty- 
liable behavior which this alternative account of penalties fails to capture.  
D’Agostino, supra note 210, at 11. 
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Some have attempted to resolve the conundrum of what constitutes cheating by 
distinguishing between the constitutive and regulative rules of a game.215 They 
argue that rules that constitute what a game is cannot be violated without actually 
ceasing to play the game, while regulative rules can be violated and punishment 
for those violations imposed within the game.216 According to D’Agostino, “On 
this account, every penalty-invoking rule of [a particular game] is regulative, but 
not constitutive.”217 Under this proposal, every rule of a game is either constitutive 
or regulative, but cannot be both. D’Agostino dismisses the explanatory power of 
this “dichotomization thesis” because of the arbitrariness of the division of many 
rules into one or the other category. He wrote, “[a] rule which is regulative from 
the formal point of view (a penalty-invoking rule . . .) may be constitutive from the 
intuitive point of view.”218 
This critique of the dichotomization thesis gets at the heart of the Luis Suarez 
intentional handball issue.219 Because the rules of soccer provide for a penalty in 
exchange for his behavior, a formal approach would tell us that intentionally using 
one’s hands is merely a regulative rule of soccer. But it is difficult to think intui-
tively of a rule that is more constitutive of the game of soccer than the prohibition 
against using one’s hands.220 
Avishai Margalit discusses Thierry Henry’s deliberate handball and Maradona’s 1986 “Hand of God” 
handball by saying that they “were not fine examples of disregarding the rules. They were cases of successful 
cheating.” Avishai Margalit, Monday Morning Philosophers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www. 
nybooks.com/articles/2018/03/22/monday-morning-philosophers/. Margalit goes on to suggest that, because the 
prohibition against using one’s hands is a constitutive rule of soccer, neither Henry nor Maradona were even 
playing soccer when they deliberately used their hands! See id. 
As a concrete example of why formalism fails to explain behavior within games, 
D’Agostino offers basketball. By its rules, basketball is a “non-contact” sport.221 
See Kevin Bosner, How Basketball Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://entertainment.howstuffworks. 
com/basketball5.htm (“Basketball, by rule, is a non-contact sport.”). 
Any game of basketball, however, is full of both accidental and intentional contact 
between players, only some of which results in a penalty being called. D’Agostino 
asks, “Why is this so?” 
This is so because the players and game officials have, in effect, conspired to 
ignore certain of the rules of basketball, at least in certain situations, in order 
to promote certain interests, which they share, for instance, with team owners 
215. See generally JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995) (discussing the 
difference between constitutive and regulative rules). 
216. Id. at 27–28. 
217. D’Agostino, supra note 210, at 11. On the proposed distinction between constitutive and regulative rules, 
see Christopher Cherry, Regulative and Constitutive Rules, 23 PHIL. Q. 301, 302 (1973). 
218. D’Agostino, supra note 210, at 12. The idea that any behavior with a specified and explicit penalty is 
necessarily within the rules of a game is intuitively unsatisfying and can lead to absurd results. As Kathleen 
Pearson argued, “penalties for breaking the law are contained within the law books, but no sensible person 
concludes, therefore, that all acts are within the law.” Kathleen M. Pearson, Deception, Sportsmanship, and 
Ethics, in PHILOSOPHIC INQUIRY IN SPORT 183, 184 (William J. Morgan & Klaus V. Meier eds., 2d ed., 1995). 
219. See supra Section II.A.1 for a discussion of the Luis Suarez handball incident. 
220. 
221. 
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and spectators—e.g., to make the game more exciting than it would be if the 
rules were more strictly enforced.222 
Although the formal rules of basketball specify a particular sanction for prohibited 
behavior, “an unofficial system of conventions . . . determines how the official 
rules of the game will be applied in various concrete circumstances.”223 No formal 
set of rules generally provides a guide on how rules are actually applied and 
enforced in a game; instead, one can only understand these conventions and the 
ethos of a game by studying how it is actually played. Of course, the formal rules 
can be modified to clearly supplant or supplement the ethos of a game if it is deter-
mined by those in authority that the manner in which the rules are being applied is 
not in the broader interests of the game. 
All games are governed by a set of formal rules as well as an ethos, or a system 
of conventions that dictates how and when the formal rules of a game are 
applied.224 If we seek to understand a game solely by looking at the formal rules of 
the game, our understanding will fall short because we are not taking into account 
the ethos by which the game is played. This is the shortcoming of the formalist 
approach to examining how games work.225 “[T]he ethos of a game distinguishes 
between behavior that is permissible, behavior that is impermissible but accepta-
ble, and behavior that is unacceptable.”226 This account leaves out, however, 
behavior that is permissible but unacceptable. Baseball is full of examples of such 
behavior, such as running up the score or bunting when one’s team is winning by a 
number of runs.227 
See, e.g., Craig Bogar, Running Up the Score: Is it Ever Acceptable?, SPORT DIG. (Jan. 20, 2011), http:// 
thesportdigest.com/2011/01/running-up-the-score-is-it-ever-acceptable/. 
One important distinction is between morality and convention: a baseball fielder 
who traps the ball just after it bounces is generally expected to pretend to have 
caught the ball and nobody thinks it a violation of the code of fair play to try to 
mislead the umpires in this way. But doing the same thing in cricket would be con-
sidered unsportsmanlike, embarrassing, and even shameful. A fielder caught doing 
this in cricket would be seen to have been “exposed as someone lacking in moral 
fibre.”228 This distinction has been used as an illustration of the difference between 
morality and convention: “[M]orality is universal, independent of authority, and 
has to do with genuine welfare, while convention varies across societies, depends 
on decree, and governs matters of no intrinsic importance.”229 Violation of a 
222. D’Agostino, supra note 210, at 14. 
223. Id. (emphasis removed). For a detailed analysis of whether officials are justified in temporal variance in 
the calling of various kinds of fouls, see Berman, Let ‘em Play, supra note 45, at 1334–46. 
224. D’Agostino, supra note 210, at 7. 
225. See id. 
226. Id. at 15. 
227. 
228. PAPINEAU, supra note 2, at 63–64. 
229. Id. at 64 (citing a study showing that children “discriminate naturally between moral principles, which 
they view as unalterable, and rules instituted by parochial authorities, which they assume can be easily 
changed”). 
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“convention” is ordinarily not a moral issue but sometimes such violations can rise 
to the level of immoral behavior.230 
The same is true in the criminal justice context. In criminal procedure, local con-
ventions can dictate, for example, when a plea agreement has been reached and the 
extent to which parties can rely on a common understanding. Some defense law-
yers forgo filing motions for discovery because of a shared understanding of the 
conventions governing informal discovery. In that way, the observation (or viola-
tion) of a convention can become a more important matter than just convention 
alone. This is why a cricket player falsely claiming a catch can be said to be behav-
ing immorally, while a baseball outfielder engaged in the exact same action would 
not be subject to the same moral judgment.231 Cricket players collectively agree to 
self-police while baseball players collectively agree to try to fool the umpire when 
possible.232 Papineau explained: 
The various understandings of fair play observed by different sports are like 
contracts that you enter into when you start a match. . . . The different stand-
ards upheld by different sports are at first pass just alternative contractual 
arrangements, different sets of expectations about what the players owe each 
other.233 
Actors in the criminal justice system are frequently governed as much by informal 
norms and understandings as by the formal rules of evidence and criminal 
procedure. 
Mitchell Berman makes the same point by comparing the norms of baseball and 
golf—in the latter, there is an expectation that players will confess an infraction 
even when they could get away with it. He tells the story of Bobby Jones assessing 
himself a one-stroke penalty for moving the ball when nobody else saw the infrac-
tion: “Applauded afterwards for his integrity, Jones would have none of it: ‘You 
might as well praise me for not robbing banks.’”234 By contrast, Berman describes 
baseball as a sport that is “widely understood, even glorified, as a game of cheating 
and deception—from spitballs and sign stealing to the hidden-ball trick.”235 
Of course, adherence to convention can at times amount to complicity in an 
immoral or unjust system. Some social conventions can serve to prop up an unjust 
regime or hierarchy, and sometimes adhering to convention is itself immoral. Even 
230. Papineau’s example is driving on the wrong side of the road. Id. at 66. 
231. Id. at 67 (“Anybody taking part in a cricket match has effectively agreed to abide by the cricketers’ code 
of practice, and in particular not to claim catches they haven’t made.”). 
232. Id. at 64. Examples of this occur throughout baseball, including the practice of catchers attempting to 
“frame” pitches so the umpire will call them strikes when they are really balls. Id. at 71–72. 
233. Id. at 68. 
234. Berman, Let ‘em Play, supra note 45, at 1332 n.22 (quoting ROBERT SOMMERS & ARNOLD PALMER, 
GOLF ANECDOTES: FROM THE LINKS OF SCOTLAND TO TIGER WOODS 81–82 (2004)). 
235. Id. Berman also quotes Chicago Cubs president Andy MacPhail: “There is a culture of deception in 
[baseball]. It’s been in this game for 100 years. I do not look at this in terms of ethics. It’s the culture of the 
game.” Id. 
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if the conventions of rugby, for instance, condone or encourage eye gouging and 
worse, and even if the tradition of bicycle racing tolerates or even encourages 
doping, these practices could be considered immoral, especially if they lead to real- 
world harms outside of the game.236 Rule breaking can be strategic—as in an inten-
tional foul in basketball—or contemptible—as in eye-gouging in rugby. In the real 
world of criminal litigation, norms of conduct in many courthouses dictate that 
defense lawyers waive procedural rights of their clients at astonishingly high rates, 
often without any apparent benefit to the defendant.237 Although contrary behavior 
would violate widely accepted local norms of behavior, it is likely the only way to 
defend the rights of the defendant and uphold the stated values of the system. 
Certain contexts seem to encourage and even celebrate a benign disregard for 
formal rules. Where most participants in a system seem to agree that a degree of 
“rule-bending” is appropriate and even expected, analyses of cheating and fair 
play become more difficult. One defense of this attitude is where such behavior is 
not only generally condoned but also consistent with the broader goals of the game 
or system within which it is practiced. Baseball presents the starkest example in 
sports of this phenomenon and may share with the criminal justice system a cele-
bration of some degree of rule-bending.238 
Baseball and criminal litigation share a history of what could be called “folk her-
oes who are also outlaws.”239 The narrative of outlaws in baseball fits into a broader 
American narrative that celebrates rule-breaking and those who “skirted . . . just 
inside the rules.”240 As examples of plays that complied with the formal rules but 
seemed to be at odds with some broader principle of the game, legal (and baseball) 
historian Paul Finkelman has cited baseball owner Bill Veeck’s sending a dwarf to 
bat in order to guarantee a walk.241 He also noted Reggie Jackson’s breaking up a 
double play by intentionally interfering with a throw, knowing that he was already 
out and that the only penalty for interference was that he would be called out.242 
One can imagine that both Veeck and Jackson were criticized and celebrated for 
their tactical moves, depending on the loyalties of the commentator. 
This ambivalence toward the formal rules of a game has been compared to a 
broader American ambivalence toward rules and authority.243 But to be considered 
236.  See PAPINEAU, supra note 2, at 70–71. 
237. See generally AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT (2009) (detailing the 
norms of conduct that make defense lawyers waive procedural rights). 
238. Finkelman, supra note 13, at 239–40, 244 (noting that baseball and the law are similar, and both 
encourage learning “to manipulate the rules to our advantage”). 
239. Id. at 244. 
240. Id. at 245. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. David Luban & Daniel Luban, Cheating in Baseball, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BASEBALL 187 
(Leonard Cassuto & Stephen Partridge, eds., 2011) (“At one level, Americans understand the importance of laws 
and extol the rule of law. At another level, we hate red tape and despise robotic rule-following. It’s a cultural 
contradiction engraved in our national psyche.”). 
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morally acceptable, rule-breaking must not systematically disadvantage one team 
or violate some fundamental principle of the game.244 Some actions violate not 
only the formal rules of the game but also broader moral commands. Although the 
rules of baseball forbid a pitcher from intentionally hitting the batter, the practice 
is widely accepted from a moral perspective but only as long as the pitched ball 
hits the batter below his neck and head. “The game’s unwritten rules have always 
allowed plunking the batter below the neckline . . . in fact, that’s how teams 
enforce the code. But players and fans have always agreed that outright headhunt-
ing is beyond the pale, just as bribing umpires would be.”245 
Rogers Hornsby, one of baseball’s legends, said, “I’ve been in pro baseball since 
1914 and I’ve cheated, or watched someone on my team cheat, in practically every 
game. You’ve got to cheat.”246 Examining the question of cheating in baseball, 
authors David and Daniel Luban distinguish between two kinds of cheating, saying 
that the “right kind” of cheating belongs “in an unusual moral category: wrong-
doing that baseball lovers would rather have in the game than not.”247 In this cate-
gory, the authors include tactics like stealing signs and taking shortcuts around the 
basepath when the umpire is not looking.248 
See id. (“The fact is that many of the most beloved and colorful stories in the annals of baseball involve 
cheating.”). Controversy over stealing signs broke into the public consciousness in 2020, when it as revealed that 
the 2017 World Series champion Houston Astros had employed a sophisticated algorithmic system called 
“codebreaker” to monitor and decode signals and inform batters of what pitches to expect. See Jared Diamond, 
“Dark Arts” and “Codebreaker”: The Origins of the Houston Astros’ Cheating Scheme, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/houston-astros-cheating-scheme-dark-arts-codebreaker-11581112994. 
Major League Baseball fined the team five million dollars and suspended both the manager and the general 
manager for one year. See Katherine Acquavella & R.J. Anderson, A.J. Hinch Suspended Then Fired; Draft 
Picks Lost, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlb-hammers-astros-in-cheating- 
scandal-jeff-luhnow-aj-hinch-suspended-then-fired-draft-picks-lost/. 
Because of the widespread acceptance 
and even celebration of these tactics by fans, the authors question whether such 
actions, though contrary to the formal rules of the game, constitute cheating.249 
Criminal lawyers delight in telling stories of courtroom stunts that seem close 
cousins to these examples of deception in sports. Clarence Darrow is said to have 
put a long wire in his cigar and smoked it during his opponent’s closing argument, 
distracting the jury members who, instead of listening to his adversary’s argument, 
wondered why the ash would not fall off Darrow’s cigar.250 
See Tim Jones, Renowned Attorney Trying to Bring some L.A. into Law, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 31, 2004), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2004-03-31-0403310174-story.html (explaining how Clarence 
Darrow used a cigar to distract the jury in the Scopes Monkey Trial in 1925). 
The story is well- 
known of Abraham Lincoln winning a case by referring, during cross-examination 
244. See id. (“We tolerate rule-breaking as long as it’s equal-opportunity and doesn’t violate some deeper 
principle, and we admire the audacity of players who care more about the game than the rule book.”). 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 185. 
247. Id. at 186. 
248. 
249. See Luban & Luban, supra note 243, at 186 (“The label ‘cheating’ is morally loaded: by definition, 
cheating is wrong. By definition, wrong is what you cannot do. But far from becoming incensed by cheating in 
baseball, fans tolerate it and—truth be told—fans enjoy it. What’s going on?”). 
250. 
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of a key prosecution witness, to a document that he said showed the night in ques-
tion to be moonless, when in fact it said no such thing.251 Others later accused 
Lincoln of unethical conduct as a trial lawyer for the phantom moonlight trick,252 
and indeed, such antics may violate Rules 3.5(d) and 8.4(d) of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.253 Scholars and experts have weighed in on whether ethics 
allow, for example, a lawyer to put glasses on a defendant or witness to make him 
look more believable,254 
See Kevin Deutsch, Defense Lawyers Swear by Gimmick of Having Defendants Wearing Glasses at 
Trial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/defense-lawyers-swear- 
gimmick-defendants-wearing-glasses-trial-article-1.138930 (providing explanation of the “nerd defense” by 
defense attorney Harvey Slovis who stated, “Glasses soften [defendants’] appearance so that they don’t look 
capable of committing a violent crime . . . . I’ve tried cases where there’s been a tremendous amount of evidence, 
but my client wore glasses, dressed well and got acquitted.”). Research has shown that the “nerd defense” seems 
to work on jurors—a 2008 study claimed that wearing glasses led to more acquittals. Id. See also Janet Lee 
Hoffman & Andrew Weiner, The Juror as Audience: The Impact of Non-Verbal Communication at Trial, 32 LIT. 
J. 3, 5 (2013) (stating that using eyeglasses to mislead jurors might violate ethical rule prohibiting lawyers from 
engaging in dishonest conduct or misrepresentation). 
and on whether, and to what extent, a criminal defendant 
can be dressed up to appear more innocent than normal,255 among other tactics.256 
C. Regulatory Responses to Gamesmanship in Sport 
John Rawls once famously described a conversation he had with legal scholar 
Harry Kalven about baseball. Rawls cited with approval Kalven’s description of 
baseball as the perfect game because its rules, he believed, were static and pristine 
from the beginning: 
[T]he rules of the game are in equilibrium: that is, from the start, the diamond 
was made just the right size, the pitcher’s mound just the right distance from 
home plate, etc., and this makes possible the marvelous plays, such as the dou-
ble play. The physical layout of the game is perfectly adjusted to the human 
skills it is meant to display and to call into graceful exercise. Whereas basket-
ball, e.g., is constantly . . . adjusting its rules to get them in balance.257 
John Rawls, The Best of All Games, BOS. REV. (Mar. 1, 2008), http://bostonreview.net/rawls-the-best-of- 
all-games. 
251. See, e.g., JOHN EVANGELIST WALSH, MOONLIGHT: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE ALMANAC TRIAL 3 
(2000). There is a whole genre of “phantom document” anecdotes, in which a lawyer suggests that a document 
says something while knowing it is not true. In addition to Lincoln’s “phantom moonlight” trick, this was a plot 
point in “A Few Good Men.” 
252. Id. at 89–99 (describing Lincoln as “clever but unscrupulous” and noting that there are rumors that 
Lincoln later edited the document for use during other trials). 
253. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage in 
conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.”); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”). 
254. 
255. See Hoffman & Weiner, supra note 253, at 4–6. 
256. See generally JACK MARSHALL & PROETHICS, LTD., CLARENCE DARROW’S ETHICS LESSONS FOR 
TODAY’S MORE ETHICAL LAWYER (2018) (discussing the ethical implications of a variety of “court room 
stunts”). 
257. 
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Of course, the truth is that baseball has changed its rules many times during its his-
tory and continues to do so.258 These rule changes come in response to new tactics 
that existing rules cannot accommodate without changing the nature of the game 
for the worse. Administrators have also implemented rule changes in response to 
developments in the manner in which the game is played, as when Major League 
Baseball lowered the height of the pitcher’s mound in 1969 in response to a “com-
plete dominance of pitching over hitting” that year.259 
Earl Nash, Pitching Mound History—Balance Between Pitchers and Batters, BOSOX INJECTION, https:// 
bosoxinjection.com/2013/12/13/pitching-mound-history/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2020). There have been multiple 
other rule changes. See, e.g., Earl Nash, Origins of Baseball: “In the Big Inning . . .” When Did 60’-6’’ Become 
the Distance From Pitching Plate to Home Plate?, BOSOX INJECTION, https://bosoxinjection.com/2013/05/02/ 
origins-of-baseball-in-the-big-inning-when-did-60-6-become-the-distance-from-pitching-plate-to-home-plate/ 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2020) (stating that overhand pitching was allowed for the first time in 1888, and the 
resulting harder throws spurred the new rule in 1893 that increased the distance between the pitcher and 
batter); David Hiskey, There Once Was a Little Person Who Played in Major League Baseball, 
TODAYIFOUNDOUT (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2012/03/there-once-was-a- 
little-person-who-played-in-major-league-baseball/ (stating that the American League once banned little 
people from playing after Bill Veeck signed a little person who managed an easy walk in a game). For an 
evolution of the rules of baseball, see Gietschier, supra note 258, at 9–20. 
The infield fly rule, which prohibits fielders in baseball from purposely dropping 
a fly ball to force a double play, has been a fruitful metaphor for legal scholars for 
close to a half century, since the University of Pennsylvania Law Review published 
an “Aside” entitled “The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule.”260 The 
publication has been called “the launching point of the Law and Baseball move-
ment.”261 Two later authors in the movement summarized the rule as: 
At its core, the infield fly rule is a rule against a form of strategic play that 
results in a deviation from the normal principle that the offensive team bene-
fits from always seeking to hit the ball in such a way as to maximize the 
chance of a base hit. . . .262 
When the administrators of baseball noticed that players had discovered that the 
rules allowed for a strategic advantage that did not advance the broader purposes 
258. See Steven P. Gietschier, The Rules of Baseball, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BASEBALL 9–20 
(Leonard Cassuto & Stephen Partridge, eds., 2011). 
259. 
260. William S. Stevens, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474 (1975). 
261. Neil B. Cohen & Spencer Weber Waller, Taking Pop-Ups Seriously: The Jurisprudence of the Infield Fly 
Rule, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 453, 454 (2004); see also Yablon, supra note 44, at 238 (listing a series of law review 
articles published in response to the Stevens essay); John J. Flynn, Further Aside - A Comment on “The Common 
Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule,” 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 241 (1978) (critiquing and expanding on Stevens’s 
analogy); Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 825–26 (discussing the influence of baseball rules and baseball traditions 
on legal scholars); Mark W. Cochran, The Infield Fly Rule and the Internal Revenue Code: An Even Further 
Aside, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567 (1988) (responding to the Stevens essay); Margaret A. Berger, Rethinking 
the Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at Sentencing: Of Relevant Conduct and Hearsay and the Need for an 
Infield Fly Rule, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 96, 97 (1992) (comparing prosecutors and baseball players and arguing for 
the functional equivalent of the “infield fly rule”: a new evidentiary rule). 
262. Cohen & Waller, supra note 261, at 458 (providing a concise description of the rule but also comparing 
the infield fly situation to intentional walks and sacrifice bunts). 
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of the game, they changed the rule. By doing so, they took away the incentive for 
that behavior and eliminated it from the sport. 
Some have called for the abolition of the infield fly rule, characterizing it as 
“protectionist rulemaking” and calling instead for a fuller embrace of deception 
and trickery in baseball.263 Whether this point of view is correct depends on one’s 
perspective of just what the “objectives” of baseball are. The normative determina-
tion regarding whether (and to what extent) baseball should embrace deception 
and trickery necessarily precedes any discussion about whether particular strategic 
behavior should be allowed and rewarded.264 Although the infield fly rule may 
have been appropriate in the gentler times in which it was adopted, goes the argu-
ment, “proper conduct in today’s America is governed not by rigidity and gentility, 
but by autonomy, risk taking, and shamelessness.”265 If true, then perhaps the 
infield fly rule is indeed “a perversion of protectionism based on outdated 
values.”266 
When a new development or tactic in sports is deemed harmful to some broader 
interest of the sport, adjudicators (the sporting equivalent of legislatures) can 
change the rules to accommodate the game or ban the practice. Former University 
of North Carolina basketball coach Dean Smith developed the “four corners 
offense” in the 1960s to run out the clock and hold on to a lead. Four players would 
spread out to four distant corners of the offensive half of the court and the fifth 
would stay in the middle dribbling. The players would occasionally switch posi-
tions but generally the point was to slow the action down so the game clock 
expired. Although the strategy was useful in reducing the number of possessions in 
a game and retaining a lead, it led to a very boring style of play. Smith used this 
strategy very successfully for two decades until the NCAA finally responded to 
calls for reform and instituted a shot clock in 1985, which limits the amount of 
time one team can have the ball on a single possession.267 
See Gordon S. White Jr., Boring, But It Worked, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 1982), https://archive.nytimes.com/ 
www.nytimes.com/packages/html/sports/year_in_sports/03.07.html (stating that the NCAA adopted the 45- 
second shot clock in order to thwart the stall that Dean Smith used in his “four corners” strategy). 
Because the four corners 
offense was seen as detrimental to the overall appeal of college basketball and 
263. Andrew J. Guilford & Joel Mallord, Time to Drop the Infield Fly Rule and End a Common Law Anomaly, 
164 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 283 (2015). In support of their proposal, the authors argue that the purposely dropped 
infield pop-up is no different from the other “bag of tricks filled with deception, risk, and even purposely dropped 
balls” available to baseball players and list many such tactics considered perfectly appropriate in the game of 
baseball. Id. at 286–87. 
264. See id. at 288 (“[T]he rules of sports, like a society’s laws, must reflect cultural values . . . [and] are 
meant to ensure proper conduct, and it is society that determines what is proper.”) (citing Stevens, supra note 
260, at 1479). 
265. Id. at 288. The authors published this essay in the relatively genteel era of 2015. It is difficult to imagine 
what conduct might be permissible on the baseball diamond today if we allow the evolving standards of decency 
in popular culture to dictate acceptable on-field behavior. See id. 
266. Id. at 288; see also Eldon L. Ham, Aside the Aside: The True Precedent of Baseball in Law, The Residue 
of Luck – Or, Who’s Not on First?, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213, 213 (2003) (“In baseball, as in free market 
economics and in law, the chip-on-the-shoulder, tobacco-spittin’ object of competition is to win.”). 
267. 
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therefore antithetical to the broader values of the game, the league took action to 
remove the incentives for this style of play and it largely disappeared.268 As in the 
earlier cases involving teams purposely (and rationally) losing a match,269 this tac-
tic was seen as detrimental to the overall objectives of the game. Once this determi-
nation was made, it was a relatively simple matter to change the procedural rules 
to eliminate the incentive for teams to engage in this conduct. The same thing can 
and does happen in the world of criminal litigation. 
IV. WHAT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CAN LEARN FROM SPORTS 
As with sports, the rules of criminal litigation are always subject to refinement 
and modification. If we decide that a particular practice has become detrimental to 
the overall objectives of the system, we can always clarify and refine the rules to 
move that practice clearly outside of the rules. As philosopher Howe stated, “It is 
no use saying ‘that’s the way it’s played,’ any more than ‘the poor will always be 
with us,’ or ‘war is inevitable’; we can always choose to play differently than we 
do.”270 But it is those in charge of making and implementing the formal rules of 
play, rather than those engaged in the competition, who should bear the burden of 
changing the rules. 
Examination of sports rules can shed light on the rules, laws, and procedures 
governing our lives. “When a subject has become overfamiliar,” according to one 
scholar of law and sports, “sometimes it is best approached from the side rather 
than head-on.”271 A comparative analysis of the rules of various sports shows that 
sets of rules in particular sports, just like laws in particular societies, reflect the val-
ues and culture of those sports.272 And public outcry over what seems like an unjust 
application of a rule can spark a broad outcry about the evolving values and goals 
of the larger system governed by those rules.273 The process of changing sports 
rules to better reflect the overall values of the game can provide a guide to how 
rules of criminal procedure should and should not be changed to better achieve 
broader goals of the criminal justice system. As in the justice system, allegations 
268. See Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 15, at 1023. 
269. See supra Section II.A.2. 
270. Howe, supra note 1, at 222. 
271. Michael Herz, How the Electoral College Imitates the World Series, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1191, 1191 
(2002). 
272. See Ilhyung Lee, The Danish Question, the Mailman, and Justice Scalia: Examining the Group Play 
Tiebreaker Rules, 27 SO. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 133, 136 (2017) (“A sport’s rules and regulations reflect the 
purpose and goals of the governing body (sometimes guided by the elusive ‘best interests’ of the game), just as 
the legislature’s enacted laws reflect the public’s will and desire.”). 
273. Lee attributes changes in the sports and law context to public reactions: 
Some rules, like some laws, receive little attention until their application in unusual circumstances 
results in an outcome that the fan base, the media, and perhaps some within the governing body 
itself, find objectionable. Such instances sometimes trigger debate, deliberations, and even 
amendment.  
Id. 
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of gamesmanship in sports, or offensively using a rule to achieve a purpose other 
than the rule’s intended purpose, allow us an opportunity to refine or amend the 
rules to better serve important interests of the overall system.274 
The rules of engagement are always subject to modification in service of larger 
systemic objectives. The legislative responses to the Melendez-Diaz decision can 
be seen as one such example.275 In response to the potential for a cascade of dis-
missals and acquittals simply because of the absence of a lab technician, state 
legislatures enacted notice-and-demand statutes. Contrary to some predictions,276 
the criminal justice system adapted to the newly understood confrontation rights 
and the system did not grind to a halt. 
While the enactment of notice-and-demand statutes came in response to a con-
stitutional decision from the Supreme Court, rules of criminal litigation have 
evolved to accommodate changing social norms as well. In advocating for passage 
of the federal rape shield law in 1978, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman 
described what many saw as a pressing problem of the manner in which rape trials 
were conducted: 
Too often in this country victims of rape are humiliated and harassed when 
they report and prosecute the rape. Bullied and cross-examined about their 
prior sexual experiences, many find the trial almost as degrading as the rape 
itself. Since rape trials become inquisitions into the victim’s morality, not tri-
als of the defendant’s innocence or guilt, it is not surprising that it is the least 
reported crime. It is estimated that as few as one in ten rapes is ever 
reported.277 
Throughout the 1970s, advocates argued for passage of “rape shield” laws to 
change the way that rape charges were prosecuted and defended. These laws gener-
ally prohibited inquiry into the complaining witness’s prior sexual history and 
character for promiscuity or chastity.278 The practice of putting the victim on trial, 
argued reformers, resulted in low rates of reporting and prosecution and high rates  
274. See id. at 138 (“Ultimately, the game’s rules, like a society’s laws, reflect the values and culture of the 
jurisdictional base that enacts them. Rules should make sense, and when they do not, action is required.”). In his 
article comparing tiebreaker rules among various sports, Ilhyung Lee describes an unhappy application of the Big 
12 tiebreaker rules, by which the University of Oklahoma’s football team was named champion of the Big 12 
South Division, even though the University of Texas football team had an identical record and had defeated 
Oklahoma during the regular season. After calls for reform, the tiebreaker rules were changed within two years. 
See id. at 148. 
275. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
276. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 343 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The result, in 
many cases, will be that the prosecution cannot meet its burden of proof, and the guilty defendant goes free on a 
technicality that, because it results in an acquittal, cannot be reviewed on appeal.”). 
277. Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second 
Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 764 (1986) (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth 
Holtzman)). 
278. See id. at 764–71 (describing rape shield laws and their origins). 
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of acquittal.279 More broadly, advocates for women “attacked the entire jurispru-
dence of rape as an embodiment of stereotypes and attitudes highly contemptuous 
of women.”280 Very quickly, both state and federal legislators passed rape shield 
laws and other legislation that eliminated the requirement that a complaining wit-
ness’s testimony be corroborated to support a conviction and that a complaining 
witness show that she physically resisted the attack to the utmost.281 
As courtroom tactics came to seem increasingly out-of-step with contemporary 
understandings of rape and inconsistent with the stated goals of the system, legisla-
tors changed both the procedural and substantive rules of engagement to modern-
ize the system. The new rules were widely celebrated as a needed corrective to an 
outdated system of trial.282 As feminists joined forces with traditional law-and- 
order legislators in jurisdictions across the country, “[t]he result was nothing short 
of a full-scale revision of existing rape law.”283 Today, almost half a century after 
the rapid revision of rape law, some argue that the reforms of the 1970s and early 
1980s should be re-examined and amended.284 
Just as legislatures responded to evolving public views by changing the substan-
tive and procedural law of sexual assault in the 1970s and 1980s, some today are 
calling for a change in how prosecutors can use uncharged allegations of miscon-
duct against criminal defendants. Because federal sentencing law allows for the 
enhancement of sentences through the use of uncharged misconduct, federal prose-
cutors can elect to withhold certain conduct from evaluation by the jury and then 
raise it during the sentencing phase, when it will be subject neither to the scrutiny 
of a jury nor the more stringent standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.285 
279.  Id. at 767. Without rape shield laws: 
In effect, these common law evidentiary rules allowed defendants to turn the tables. No longer 
was the defendant the only one on trial. Also on trial was the complainant, to determine whether 
she was the type of woman who consents, the type of woman to lie about it, and hence the type of 
woman who should not be protected by the law, at least not at the expense of a presumptively 
good man.  
I. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 835 (2013). 
280.  Galvin, supra note 277, at 768; see also Capers, supra note 279, at 835. 
281. See Capers, supra note 279, at 834, 839. 
282. See, e.g., J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth 
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 549–50 (1980) (citing numerous law review articles that criticized the old 
rules and argued that it was “manifestly unfair to women and a reflection of outmoded morality” to allow the 
complaining witness’s prior sexual history to be admitted at trial); Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s 
Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12–32 (1977) (discussing the old system’s 
focus on the victim’s sexual history and the various efforts made to make trial less inimical to an accuser). 
283. Capers, supra note 279, at 839. 
284. See, e.g., id. at 842 (“Far from liberating women from our long history of measuring their worth against a 
chastity yardstick, rape shield rules have in fact reinstantiated chastity norms.”); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, 
and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 627 (2009) (discussing how realist reforms have produced only 
limited benefits and should be further amended). 
285. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a) allows sentencing courts to consider all relevant conduct, 
including uncharged or acquitted conduct, that can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence when 
determining a sentence. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 153 (1997) (per curiam); cf. Witte v. United 
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One scholar has compared this situation to the “infield fly rule” problem in baseball 
and called for adoption of evidentiary rules to limit this practice in federal sentenc-
ing hearings.286 The infield fly rule was adopted as “a legislative response to 
actions that were previously permissible, though contrary to the spirit of the 
sport.”287 In baseball prior to the enactment of the infield fly rule, the umpire had 
the discretion “to disallow the double play in egregious circumstances” just as a 
federal sentencing judge is free to disregard evidence of uncharged misconduct.288 
But a clear rule prohibiting the use of uncharged misconduct in sentencing would 
enhance certainty and reduce gamesmanship in charging and prosecution, just as 
the infield fly rule has done.289 
Others have argued that the federal law of interlocutory appeals would be 
improved by following the lead of sports leagues and instituting a form of limited 
“instant replay.”290 Professor Kenneth Kilbert would allow each side in a civil case 
one “challenge appeal” that could be used at any time during the pendency of a 
case, without asking permission of any judge.291 Kilbert describes how the 
National Football League experimented with and refined the rules for using instant 
replay to respond to criticisms of how it was being implemented.292 Over a rela-
tively short period of time, the procedural system evolved from being entirely 
referee-initiated and unlimited in the number of permissible instant replays to one 
in which coaches could initiate challenges but were limited in the number of chal-
lenges.293 These refinements were made in response to critiques that the earlier sys-
tem was too cumbersome and inefficient.294 The standard of review has always 
retained a degree of deference to the on-field call, with a reversal warranted only in 
the face of “indisputable visual evidence” or “clear and obvious visual evidence” 
that the initial call was incorrect.295 Major League Baseball, the last major sports 
league to utilize instant replay, also evolved from a system in which only umpires 
States, 515 U.S. 389, 405–06 (1995) (holding that considering relevant conduct at sentencing does not constitute 
“punishment” and therefore is not subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
286. See Berger, supra note 261, at 97. 
287. Stevens, supra note 260, at 1477. 
288. Berger, supra note 261, at 97. 
289. See id. 
290. Kenneth Kilbert, Instant Replay and Interlocutory Appeals, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 281 (2017) 
(arguing this could be accomplished because “[s]ports and civil litigation share many common attributes, 
including the existence of winners and losers, reliance on rules, an adversary system, and neutral decision- 
makers”). 
291. Id. at 299. 
292. Id. at 285–87. 
293. Id. at 287. Kilbert argues that the parties themselves are best positioned to decide which pre-trial issues 
should be appealed and any efficiency concerns are addressed by limiting the number of “challenge appeals” in 
federal civil litigation to one per side. 
294. See id. at 295, 299 (“One obvious parallel between interlocutory appeals in federal civil cases and instant 
replay review in professional sports is that, despite inefficiency concerns, both have evolved toward more error 
correction over the years.”). 
295. Id. at 288. 
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could initiate review to a system in which each team’s manager can initiate a 
challenge.296 
Just as baseball instituted the infield fly rule to stop strategic behavior on the 
part of infielders that took away from the overall enjoyment of the game, and as 
football developed procedural limitations on the use of instant replay for the same 
reason, the criminal justice system has evolved to address behavior or tactics that 
were seen as counter-productive to the broad mission of the system. Legislatures 
enacted notice-and-demand statutes to check the prospect of criminal cases being 
dismissed when chemists and forensic witnesses were not called to testify in every 
case involving drugs or scientific evidence.297 Courts and legislatures changed the 
way in which sexual assault cases were litigated in response to evolving social 
views of appropriateness.298 Courts and legislatures should continue this response 
to litigation behavior that does not advance the broad objectives of the criminal 
justice system. And as the system appropriately assigns very different roles to pros-
ecutors and defense lawyers, it is entirely appropriate for different rules to apply to 
these actors in this context.299 Having a lower level of tolerance for gamesmanship 
by prosecutors is consistent with the core values of the system. 
Legislators could and should respond to the practice of prosecutors failing to dis-
close favorable evidence by passing laws requiring broader disclosure than cur-
rently required under federal constitutional law. Courts and state bar associations 
could achieve the same result by court rule or by interpretations of existing ethical 
rules. And of course, elected prosecutors could do the same by changing office pol-
icy and practice. Many would agree that prosecutorial gamesmanship in this area 
subverts fundamental objectives of the criminal justice system, but reform efforts 
have not solved the problem. 
Similarly, the use of racially-motivated peremptory strikes in jury selection 
undermines core values of the system and current doctrine has failed to effectively 
discourage the practice. Because of their dual role as advocate and as minister of 
justice,300 prosecutors’ use of race in selecting juries is especially troubling and 
should be viewed in a different light than similar practices by defense lawyers.301 
This is a form of gamesmanship in criminal litigation that could easily be curtailed 
296. Id. at 289–90, 292. Similarly, Judith Maute has argued that amendments to rules governing civil 
litigation are analogous to changes in rules governing sports, to adjust to developments in tactics or new 
normative desires about what behavior and outcomes we want to encourage. See Judith L. Maute, Sporting 
Theory of Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REV. 7, 9 (1987). 
297. See supra note 142 (discussing notice-and-demand statutes). 
298. See supra notes 278–81 and accompanying text (discussing changes in “rape shield” laws). 
299. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text (discussing differences between prosecutors and defense 
attorneys). 
300. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“It is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.”). 
301. See Abbe Smith, A Call to Abolish Peremptory Challenges by Prosecutors, 27 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 1163, 
1164–65 (2014). 
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by legislators or courts, either by eliminating the practice altogether, limiting the 
exercise of peremptory strikes to defendants, or changing the doctrinal framework 
to require a rational or plausible reason for exercising a peremptory strike. Indeed, 
the Washington Supreme Court recently expanded the Batson prohibition to 
include not only intentional discrimination but also situations in which “an objec-
tive observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory 
challenge.”302 
WASH. GEN. R. 37(e); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Any Prior Police Contact? New State Rule Deems 
that a Presumptively Invalid Reason for a Juror Strike, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 25, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/Any_prior_police_contact_new_state_rule_deems_that_a_presumptively_invalid 
(“General Rule 37 says judges shall deny a peremptory challenge if an ‘objective observer’ would view race or 
ethnicity as a factor in the use of a peremptory strike to eliminate a potential juror.”). 
Seeing a practice that threatened the legitimacy of the system, the 
court broadened the rule to more effectively curtail the use of race-based strikes. 
In the absence of an infield fly rule, nobody would criticize a second baseman 
for purposely dropping an infield fly to get a double play. If the second baseman 
did not purposely drop the ball, he would be rightly criticized for not doing his best 
to win the game. Not trying to exploit every opportunity within the rules can be a 
form of bad sportsmanship, violating shared norms of fair play.303 Luis Suarez, the 
women’s badminton teams, and the New York Yankees were each operating within 
the rules of their respective games. In response to each incident, the relevant gov-
erning bodies of those sports considered rule changes and actually changed the 
rules in some cases. Similarly, advocates in criminal courts should be expected to 
know the procedural rules of engagement and deploy them to their clients’ advant-
age. Strategic behavior within the ethical and legal rules is generally a productive 
and valuable aspect of the criminal justice system. Only where it threatens core 
values and objectives of the system should lawmakers step in to discourage such 
practices. 
CONCLUSION 
A December 2014 National Football League playoff game between the 
Baltimore Ravens and New England Patriots ended in a close victory for the 
Patriots, who would go on to win the Super Bowl. Bill Belichick, the coach of 
the Patriots, employed various strange offensive formations and plays that resulted 
in confusion among the Ravens defense.304 By knowing the arcana of the NFL rule 
book, Belichick was able to twice use a player assumed by the defense to be  
302. 
303. Papineau argues that the main goal of sport is to win, and gamesmanship serves that purpose: 
[G]amesmanship, in all its forms, is an integral part of competitive sport. All serious athletes are 
constantly striving to avoid defeat and ensure victory. If they can find some new angle to help 
them, they would be perverse not to go for it. An athlete who ignores an open avenue to victory is 
an athlete who is not competing seriously.  
PAPINEAU, supra note 2, at 89. 
304. LIEBOVICH, supra note 20, at 134. 
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ineligible to receive a pass.305 
Chase Stuart, Patriots’ Real Trick: Knowing the Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/01/28/sports/football/a-peek-inside-the-patriots-trick-playbook.html. 
Believing him to be ineligible, the Ravens defense 
did not cover him, and he easily caught a touchdown pass to put the Patriots in the 
lead. All of the Patriots’ plays were legal but “Ravens coach John Harbaugh was 
furious after the game, accusing the Pats of ‘deception’ and calling the formation 
‘an illegal type of a thing.’ This led [Patriots quarterback Tom] Brady to counter 
smugly that ‘maybe those guys gotta [sic] study the rulebook’ . . . .”306 An account 
of the game in the New York Times was headlined “Patriots’ Real Trick: Knowing 
the Rules.”307 
In any adversarial contest governed by rules, it is inevitable that the competitors 
will look for strategic advantage in the creative and aggressive use of those rules. 
Gamesmanship is both an inevitable and productive aspect of sports and litigation. 
When extreme forms of gamesmanship threaten to undermine core objectives of the 
system, those in charge of administering the system should respond by altering the 
rules to eliminate the rewards for this strategic play. Baseball effectively eliminated 
the strategic practice of purposely dropping infield fly balls to get a double play and 
many sports have changed their tournament rules to take away the incentive for pur-
posely losing preliminary-round matches. Legislators and courts have responded sim-
ilarly to strategic litigation tactics, changing trial procedures in sexual assault cases 
and in response to expanded defense rights under the Confrontation Clause. 
Aggressive use of existing procedural rules should be welcomed rather than con-
demned, as the practice sheds light on rules that may not advance the objectives of 
the system and forces an open conversation about what those objectives are. 
Learning from these examples of gamesmanship in sports, legislatures and courts 
should not hesitate to change the procedural rules and disincentive structures when 
necessary to eliminate forms of gamesmanship that are detrimental to the overall 
objectives of the criminal justice system. Examples include requiring broader disclo-
sure of favorable evidence by the prosecutor and more effectively barring the use of 
race in peremptory strikes by adopting an “objective observer” test in evaluating 
whether a party has engaged in race-based strikes. This refinement of the procedural 
rules is an inevitable and desirable part of any adversarial system, whether in sports or 
litigation. In this process, however, legal reformers should be careful to limit their 
efforts only to those forms of gamesmanship that threaten a broad and fundamental 
objective of the criminal justice system. At the same time, any reforms should recog-
nize the asymmetrical nature of the criminal litigation system and the distinct roles 
assigned to prosecutors and defense lawyers, affording less indulgence to gamesman-
ship by prosecutors than by defense lawyers.  
305. 
306. LEIBOVICH, supra note 20, at 134. 
307. Stuart, supra note 305. 
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